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The Resource Alternative action theory : simultaneously a critique of Georg Henrik von Wright's practical philosophy, by Ota Weinberger

Alternative action theory : simultaneously a critique of Georg Henrik von Wright's practical philosophy, by Ota Weinberger

Label
Alternative action theory : simultaneously a critique of Georg Henrik von Wright's practical philosophy
Title
Alternative action theory
Title remainder
simultaneously a critique of Georg Henrik von Wright's practical philosophy
Statement of responsibility
by Ota Weinberger
Creator
Subject
Language
  • eng
  • ger
  • eng
Member of
Cataloging source
DLC
http://library.link/vocab/creatorName
Weinberger, Ota
Index
index present
LC call number
B105.A35
LC item number
W4413 1998
Literary form
non fiction
Nature of contents
bibliography
Series statement
Theory and decision library. Series A, Philosophy and methodology of the social sciences
Series volume
v. 26
http://library.link/vocab/subjectName
  • Wright, G. H. von
  • Act (Philosophy)
  • Deontic logic
  • Logic
Label
Alternative action theory : simultaneously a critique of Georg Henrik von Wright's practical philosophy, by Ota Weinberger
Instantiates
Publication
Copyright
Bibliography note
Includes bibliographical references and indexes
Carrier category
volume
Carrier category code
nc
Carrier MARC source
rdacarrier
Content category
text
Content type code
txt
Content type MARC source
rdacontent
Contents
  • General preconditions of logical theories
  • Scope for action
  • p. 98.
  • 5.5.
  • Optimization analysis as basis for action decisions
  • p. 99.
  • 5.6.
  • The
  • admissibility of means (of modes of action)
  • p. 102.
  • 5.7.
  • p. 6.
  • The
  • agent (Subject of the action)
  • p. 103.
  • 5.8.
  • Action and program
  • p. 104.
  • 5.9.
  • Action deliberation and motive interpretation
  • p. 105.
  • 5.10.
  • 1.3.
  • The
  • justification of actions
  • p. 107.
  • 5.11.
  • The
  • institutionalist aspect of actions
  • p. 108.
  • 5.12.
  • The
  • theories of practical thinking
  • Can norms (norm-sentences) be regarded as objects of logic?
  • p. 109.
  • 5.13.
  • The
  • practical system
  • p. 110.
  • 5.14.
  • Non-derivability postulates
  • p. 111.
  • 5.15.
  • On formal teleology
  • p. 8.
  • p. 111.
  • 5.16.
  • The
  • weighting of the ends
  • p. 114.
  • 5.17.
  • System of ends and logical consistency
  • p. 115.
  • 5.18.
  • Possible and permissible means
  • 1.4.
  • p. 117.
  • 5.19.
  • Remarks on formal axiology
  • p. 118.
  • 5.20.
  • On logic of preferences
  • p. 121.
  • 5.21.
  • Ordinal and cardinal preference
  • p. 123.
  • Main types of substitute theories
  • 6.
  • On the Idea of Practical Inference. Simultaneously a study on the relationship between mental operations and actions
  • p. 125.
  • 6.1.
  • The
  • concept of practical inference
  • p. 125.
  • 6.2.
  • Comparison of practical inference with conclusions in descriptive language
  • p. 127.
  • p. 11.
  • 6.3.
  • G. H. von Wright's contribution to the theory of Practical Inference
  • p. 128.
  • 6.4.
  • Practical inference and formal teleology
  • p. 136.
  • 6.5.
  • The
  • system of ends and logical consistency
  • p. 141.
  • 2.
  • 6.6.
  • Some conclusions on practical inferences and on the relationship between mental operations and actions
  • p. 141.
  • 7.
  • From Deontic Logic to the Genuine Logic of Norms
  • p. 145.
  • 7.1.
  • The
  • concept 'Deontic Logic'
  • p. 145.
  • Once More: Is and Ought. The action-theoretical approach
  • 7.2.
  • A
  • valuation of the importance of deontic logic
  • p. 149.
  • 7.3.
  • The
  • generalization of the deduction concept
  • p. 151.
  • 7.4.
  • The
  • 1.
  • p. 37.
  • extensionality of the norm content
  • p. 154.
  • 7.5.
  • The
  • deontic operators and the problem of their mutual definability
  • p. 156.
  • 7.6.
  • Note on the iteration of deontic operators
  • p. 159.
  • 7.7.
  • 2.1.
  • The
  • problem of permission. Nature and function of permissive norms
  • p. 160.
  • 7.8.
  • The
  • conditional norm-sentence in deontic logic
  • p. 164.
  • 7.9.
  • The
  • interpretation of the deontic logics and the possibilities of their application in the normative disciplines
  • Dichotomous semantics as basis of practical philosophy
  • p. 166.
  • 7.10.
  • The
  • path toward a genuine logic of norms
  • p. 167.
  • 7.11.
  • Ought and May. Negation in the genuine logic of norms
  • p. 170.
  • 7.12.
  • The
  • p. 37.
  • norm-logical consistency postulate
  • p. 175.
  • 7.13.
  • Norm-giving and deduction
  • p. 176.
  • 7.14.
  • The
  • conditional norm-sentence
  • p. 178.
  • 7.15.
  • 2.2.
  • Quantifiers in norm-sentences
  • p. 181.
  • 7.16.
  • Norm-logical inference
  • p. 182.
  • 8.
  • Is Willing Liberum Arbitrium?
  • p. 189.
  • 8.1.
  • The
  • Two remarks on the traditional contrasting of Is and Ought
  • concept of the freedom of will and the sources of the problems of the liberum arbitrium indifferentiae
  • p. 189.
  • 8.2.
  • Freedom of will from the point of view of the information-theoretically founded action theory
  • p. 192.
  • 8.3.
  • Excursion on the recognition of causality and on causal explication
  • p. 199.
  • 8.4.
  • Excursion about the structure of the nomological causal proposition
  • p. 41.
  • p. 205.
  • 8.5.
  • Fact-transcendence of the recognition of causality as a rational basis of disposition propositions and contrafactual conditionals
  • p. 214.
  • 8.6.
  • Remark on Chisholm's Problem
  • p. 222.
  • 8.7.
  • Possible social influences on action, and the dispute around the freedom of will
  • p. 222.
  • 2.3.
  • 8.8.
  • Norm-giving in the deterministic worldview
  • p. 223.
  • 8.9.
  • Responsibility in the deterministic worldview
  • p. 225.
  • 9.
  • Action and Institution
  • p. 229.
  • 9.1.
  • Differentiation of Ought
  • Anthropological basis of the institutions
  • p. 229.
  • 9.2.
  • The
  • classical conception of the institutions according to Maurice Hauriou
  • p. 231.
  • 9.3.
  • The
  • normativistic ontology of the institutions
  • p. 236.
  • p. 43.
  • 9.4.
  • Attempt at a classification of institutions
  • p. 242.
  • 9.5.
  • Methodological implications of neo-institutionalism
  • p. 249.
  • 10.
  • The
  • Democracy Problem from a Neo-Institutionalistic Point of View
  • p. 261.
  • The
  • 2.4.
  • 10.1.
  • Against romantic conceptions of democracy
  • p. 262.
  • 10.2.
  • Some explanatory models of democracy
  • p. 263.
  • 10.3.
  • Democratic will-formation and the guiding ideas of democracy
  • p. 267.
  • 10.4.
  • Two Types of Ought?
  • The
  • idea of a discursive democracy. Democracy as an open society
  • p. 274.
  • 10.5.
  • Theory of political argumentation. Chances and dangers of the information society
  • p. 279.
  • Appendix.
  • Homage to Georg Henrik von Wright
  • p. 287.
  • 1.
  • p. 45.
  • Philosophical analysis and philosophical cognition
  • p. 290.
  • 2.
  • Countertheses against Wittgenstein's metaphilosophy
  • p. 291.
  • 3.
  • Does philosophy deal with linguistic problems or with material ones?
  • p. 292.
  • 4.
  • The
  • 2.5.
  • source of philosophical argumentation
  • p. 296.
  • 5.
  • Are there genuine philosophical problems?
  • p. 302
  • A
  • third kind of Ought: the technical Ought?
  • p. 50.
  • 3.
  • Practical Rationality
  • p. 53.
  • Nature of Logic and the Concept of the Logic of Norms
  • 3.1.
  • The
  • relationship between thought, knowledge and action
  • p. 54.
  • 3.2.
  • The
  • ambiguity of "rational"
  • p. 56.
  • 3.3.
  • The
  • p. 1.
  • ratio is not a reservoir of material-aprioristic truths
  • p. 57.
  • 3.4.
  • Philosophy of the sources of logical rationality
  • p. 59.
  • 3.5.
  • Excursion on discursive rationality
  • p. 61.
  • 3.6.
  • Action and justification
  • 1.1.
  • p. 73.
  • 3.7.
  • The
  • characteristics of practical rationality
  • p. 74.
  • 4.
  • Design of an Alternative Action Theory
  • p. 77.
  • 4.1.
  • The
  • Take Jorgen Jorgensen seriously!
  • ontological basis of the action theory
  • p. 77.
  • 4.2.
  • The
  • information-theoretical approach to action theory
  • p. 87.
  • 4.3.
  • The
  • semantic basis of action theory
  • p. 88.
  • p. 2.
  • 4.4.
  • Action theory as a structure theory
  • p. 89.
  • 4.5.
  • Action deliberation and motive interpretation
  • p. 91.
  • 4.6.
  • Summary of the basic features of the alternative formal-finalistic action theory
  • p. 92.
  • 5.
  • 1.2.
  • Fundamental Concepts and Theses of the Formal-Finalistic Action Theory
  • p. 95.
  • 5.2.
  • The
  • definition of the concept of action
  • p. 96.
  • 5.3.
  • Two kinds of information as a basis for action
  • p. 96.
  • 5.4.
Control code
39335637
Dimensions
24 cm
Extent
xvii, 318 pages
Isbn
9780792351849
Isbn Type
(hardcover : alk. paper)
Lccn
98027163
Media category
unmediated
Media MARC source
rdamedia
Media type code
n
Label
Alternative action theory : simultaneously a critique of Georg Henrik von Wright's practical philosophy, by Ota Weinberger
Publication
Copyright
Bibliography note
Includes bibliographical references and indexes
Carrier category
volume
Carrier category code
nc
Carrier MARC source
rdacarrier
Content category
text
Content type code
txt
Content type MARC source
rdacontent
Contents
  • General preconditions of logical theories
  • Scope for action
  • p. 98.
  • 5.5.
  • Optimization analysis as basis for action decisions
  • p. 99.
  • 5.6.
  • The
  • admissibility of means (of modes of action)
  • p. 102.
  • 5.7.
  • p. 6.
  • The
  • agent (Subject of the action)
  • p. 103.
  • 5.8.
  • Action and program
  • p. 104.
  • 5.9.
  • Action deliberation and motive interpretation
  • p. 105.
  • 5.10.
  • 1.3.
  • The
  • justification of actions
  • p. 107.
  • 5.11.
  • The
  • institutionalist aspect of actions
  • p. 108.
  • 5.12.
  • The
  • theories of practical thinking
  • Can norms (norm-sentences) be regarded as objects of logic?
  • p. 109.
  • 5.13.
  • The
  • practical system
  • p. 110.
  • 5.14.
  • Non-derivability postulates
  • p. 111.
  • 5.15.
  • On formal teleology
  • p. 8.
  • p. 111.
  • 5.16.
  • The
  • weighting of the ends
  • p. 114.
  • 5.17.
  • System of ends and logical consistency
  • p. 115.
  • 5.18.
  • Possible and permissible means
  • 1.4.
  • p. 117.
  • 5.19.
  • Remarks on formal axiology
  • p. 118.
  • 5.20.
  • On logic of preferences
  • p. 121.
  • 5.21.
  • Ordinal and cardinal preference
  • p. 123.
  • Main types of substitute theories
  • 6.
  • On the Idea of Practical Inference. Simultaneously a study on the relationship between mental operations and actions
  • p. 125.
  • 6.1.
  • The
  • concept of practical inference
  • p. 125.
  • 6.2.
  • Comparison of practical inference with conclusions in descriptive language
  • p. 127.
  • p. 11.
  • 6.3.
  • G. H. von Wright's contribution to the theory of Practical Inference
  • p. 128.
  • 6.4.
  • Practical inference and formal teleology
  • p. 136.
  • 6.5.
  • The
  • system of ends and logical consistency
  • p. 141.
  • 2.
  • 6.6.
  • Some conclusions on practical inferences and on the relationship between mental operations and actions
  • p. 141.
  • 7.
  • From Deontic Logic to the Genuine Logic of Norms
  • p. 145.
  • 7.1.
  • The
  • concept 'Deontic Logic'
  • p. 145.
  • Once More: Is and Ought. The action-theoretical approach
  • 7.2.
  • A
  • valuation of the importance of deontic logic
  • p. 149.
  • 7.3.
  • The
  • generalization of the deduction concept
  • p. 151.
  • 7.4.
  • The
  • 1.
  • p. 37.
  • extensionality of the norm content
  • p. 154.
  • 7.5.
  • The
  • deontic operators and the problem of their mutual definability
  • p. 156.
  • 7.6.
  • Note on the iteration of deontic operators
  • p. 159.
  • 7.7.
  • 2.1.
  • The
  • problem of permission. Nature and function of permissive norms
  • p. 160.
  • 7.8.
  • The
  • conditional norm-sentence in deontic logic
  • p. 164.
  • 7.9.
  • The
  • interpretation of the deontic logics and the possibilities of their application in the normative disciplines
  • Dichotomous semantics as basis of practical philosophy
  • p. 166.
  • 7.10.
  • The
  • path toward a genuine logic of norms
  • p. 167.
  • 7.11.
  • Ought and May. Negation in the genuine logic of norms
  • p. 170.
  • 7.12.
  • The
  • p. 37.
  • norm-logical consistency postulate
  • p. 175.
  • 7.13.
  • Norm-giving and deduction
  • p. 176.
  • 7.14.
  • The
  • conditional norm-sentence
  • p. 178.
  • 7.15.
  • 2.2.
  • Quantifiers in norm-sentences
  • p. 181.
  • 7.16.
  • Norm-logical inference
  • p. 182.
  • 8.
  • Is Willing Liberum Arbitrium?
  • p. 189.
  • 8.1.
  • The
  • Two remarks on the traditional contrasting of Is and Ought
  • concept of the freedom of will and the sources of the problems of the liberum arbitrium indifferentiae
  • p. 189.
  • 8.2.
  • Freedom of will from the point of view of the information-theoretically founded action theory
  • p. 192.
  • 8.3.
  • Excursion on the recognition of causality and on causal explication
  • p. 199.
  • 8.4.
  • Excursion about the structure of the nomological causal proposition
  • p. 41.
  • p. 205.
  • 8.5.
  • Fact-transcendence of the recognition of causality as a rational basis of disposition propositions and contrafactual conditionals
  • p. 214.
  • 8.6.
  • Remark on Chisholm's Problem
  • p. 222.
  • 8.7.
  • Possible social influences on action, and the dispute around the freedom of will
  • p. 222.
  • 2.3.
  • 8.8.
  • Norm-giving in the deterministic worldview
  • p. 223.
  • 8.9.
  • Responsibility in the deterministic worldview
  • p. 225.
  • 9.
  • Action and Institution
  • p. 229.
  • 9.1.
  • Differentiation of Ought
  • Anthropological basis of the institutions
  • p. 229.
  • 9.2.
  • The
  • classical conception of the institutions according to Maurice Hauriou
  • p. 231.
  • 9.3.
  • The
  • normativistic ontology of the institutions
  • p. 236.
  • p. 43.
  • 9.4.
  • Attempt at a classification of institutions
  • p. 242.
  • 9.5.
  • Methodological implications of neo-institutionalism
  • p. 249.
  • 10.
  • The
  • Democracy Problem from a Neo-Institutionalistic Point of View
  • p. 261.
  • The
  • 2.4.
  • 10.1.
  • Against romantic conceptions of democracy
  • p. 262.
  • 10.2.
  • Some explanatory models of democracy
  • p. 263.
  • 10.3.
  • Democratic will-formation and the guiding ideas of democracy
  • p. 267.
  • 10.4.
  • Two Types of Ought?
  • The
  • idea of a discursive democracy. Democracy as an open society
  • p. 274.
  • 10.5.
  • Theory of political argumentation. Chances and dangers of the information society
  • p. 279.
  • Appendix.
  • Homage to Georg Henrik von Wright
  • p. 287.
  • 1.
  • p. 45.
  • Philosophical analysis and philosophical cognition
  • p. 290.
  • 2.
  • Countertheses against Wittgenstein's metaphilosophy
  • p. 291.
  • 3.
  • Does philosophy deal with linguistic problems or with material ones?
  • p. 292.
  • 4.
  • The
  • 2.5.
  • source of philosophical argumentation
  • p. 296.
  • 5.
  • Are there genuine philosophical problems?
  • p. 302
  • A
  • third kind of Ought: the technical Ought?
  • p. 50.
  • 3.
  • Practical Rationality
  • p. 53.
  • Nature of Logic and the Concept of the Logic of Norms
  • 3.1.
  • The
  • relationship between thought, knowledge and action
  • p. 54.
  • 3.2.
  • The
  • ambiguity of "rational"
  • p. 56.
  • 3.3.
  • The
  • p. 1.
  • ratio is not a reservoir of material-aprioristic truths
  • p. 57.
  • 3.4.
  • Philosophy of the sources of logical rationality
  • p. 59.
  • 3.5.
  • Excursion on discursive rationality
  • p. 61.
  • 3.6.
  • Action and justification
  • 1.1.
  • p. 73.
  • 3.7.
  • The
  • characteristics of practical rationality
  • p. 74.
  • 4.
  • Design of an Alternative Action Theory
  • p. 77.
  • 4.1.
  • The
  • Take Jorgen Jorgensen seriously!
  • ontological basis of the action theory
  • p. 77.
  • 4.2.
  • The
  • information-theoretical approach to action theory
  • p. 87.
  • 4.3.
  • The
  • semantic basis of action theory
  • p. 88.
  • p. 2.
  • 4.4.
  • Action theory as a structure theory
  • p. 89.
  • 4.5.
  • Action deliberation and motive interpretation
  • p. 91.
  • 4.6.
  • Summary of the basic features of the alternative formal-finalistic action theory
  • p. 92.
  • 5.
  • 1.2.
  • Fundamental Concepts and Theses of the Formal-Finalistic Action Theory
  • p. 95.
  • 5.2.
  • The
  • definition of the concept of action
  • p. 96.
  • 5.3.
  • Two kinds of information as a basis for action
  • p. 96.
  • 5.4.
Control code
39335637
Dimensions
24 cm
Extent
xvii, 318 pages
Isbn
9780792351849
Isbn Type
(hardcover : alk. paper)
Lccn
98027163
Media category
unmediated
Media MARC source
rdamedia
Media type code
n

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