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The Resource Arguing about law : an introduction to legal philosophy, Andrew Altman

Arguing about law : an introduction to legal philosophy, Andrew Altman

Label
Arguing about law : an introduction to legal philosophy
Title
Arguing about law
Title remainder
an introduction to legal philosophy
Statement of responsibility
Andrew Altman
Creator
Subject
Language
eng
Cataloging source
DLC
http://library.link/vocab/creatorDate
1950-
http://library.link/vocab/creatorName
Altman, Andrew
Index
index present
LC call number
K230.A447
LC item number
A74 2001
Literary form
non fiction
Nature of contents
bibliography
http://library.link/vocab/subjectName
  • Law
  • Rule of law
  • Law and economics
  • Law and ethics
Label
Arguing about law : an introduction to legal philosophy, Andrew Altman
Instantiates
Publication
Copyright
Bibliography note
Includes bibliographical references and index
Carrier category
volume
Carrier category code
  • nc
Carrier MARC source
rdacarrier
Content category
text
Content type code
  • txt
Content type MARC source
rdacontent
Contents
  • Government Under Law
  • Law and the Good
  • p. 51.
  • Assessing Aquinas
  • p. 53.
  • Fuller and Fidelity to Law
  • p. 54.
  • The
  • Inner Morality of Law
  • p. 54.
  • Assessing Fuller's Inner Morality
  • p. 3.
  • p. 56.
  • Law and Social Purpose
  • p. 57.
  • Dworkin's Interpretive Theory
  • p. 58.
  • Rules and Principles: The Idea of Fit
  • p. 58.
  • Fitting the Fourth Amendment: Privacy
  • p. 59.
  • Olmstead and Beyond
  • Government by Rules
  • p. 60.
  • The
  • Role of Morality
  • p. 61.
  • The
  • Challenge of Skepticism
  • p. 62.
  • Assessing Dworkin
  • p. 65.
  • Legal Positivism: Overview
  • p. 4.
  • p. 66.
  • Austin's Theory of Law
  • p. 67.
  • Law as Command
  • p. 67.
  • Assessing Austin
  • p. 69.
  • Hart: Law as Primary and Secondary Rules
  • p. 70.
  • Types of Legal Rules
  • Fair Warning and the Formal Features of Legal Rules
  • p. 70.
  • Legal Obligation: Government and Gunman
  • p. 71.
  • Primary and Secondary Rules
  • p. 72.
  • Assessing Hart
  • p. 73.
  • Summary: Natural Law versus Positivism
  • p. 76.
  • 3.
  • p. 5.
  • The
  • Constitution
  • p. 79.
  • Popular Government and the Rule of Law
  • p. 79.
  • The
  • Undisciplined Public
  • p. 79.
  • The
  • Constitutional Design
  • Due Process
  • p. 80.
  • The
  • "Troublesome" Provisions
  • p. 82.
  • The
  • Supreme Court and Judicial Review
  • p. 84.
  • Jefferson's View
  • p. 84.
  • Judicial Review as Antidemocratic
  • p. 6.
  • p. 85.
  • The
  • Historical Record
  • p. 86.
  • Judicial Self-Restraint
  • p. 86.
  • Judicial Review and the Rule of Law
  • p. 87.
  • The
  • Judiciary as Policeman
  • The
  • p. 87.
  • The
  • Judiciary as Expert Interpreter
  • p. 88.
  • Judicial Review and Democracy
  • p. 89.
  • Ely's Argument: Perfecting Democracy
  • p. 89.
  • Criticisms of Ely: The Political Process
  • p. 91.
  • Power of the People
  • Ackerman's Argument: The Sovereign People
  • p. 91.
  • Criticisms of Ackerman: The Rule of Law
  • p. 93.
  • Constitutional Interpretation: Implicit Rights?
  • p. 94.
  • The
  • Right to Privacy: Griswold v. Connecticut
  • p. 95.
  • Criticisms of Griswold
  • 1.
  • p. 6.
  • p. 96.
  • Framers' Intent
  • p. 97.
  • Original Understanding
  • p. 99.
  • Bork's Theory
  • p. 99.
  • Criticisms of Bork: Naked Power Organs
  • p. 100.
  • Dworkin and the Constitution
  • Corruption
  • p. 102.
  • Criticisms of Dworkin
  • p. 104.
  • Bork versus Dworkin
  • p. 104.
  • Whose Morality?
  • p. 105.
  • Judgment and Action
  • p. 105.
  • The
  • p. 7.
  • Supreme Court versus Society
  • p. 106.
  • 4.
  • Private Law: Torts, Contracts, and Property
  • p. 111.
  • The
  • Functions of Private Law
  • p. 111.
  • The
  • Traditional Public-Private Distinction
  • Vengeance
  • p. 113.
  • Criticisms of the Public-Private Distinction
  • p. 115.
  • Legal Realism and the Politics of Private Law
  • p. 115.
  • Property and Progress: The Labor Injunction
  • p. 116.
  • Assessing the Realist Challenge
  • p. 117.
  • The
  • p. 8.
  • Traditional Contract-Tort Distinction
  • p. 119.
  • Criticisms of the Contract-Tort Distinction
  • p. 120.
  • Defenses of the Contract-Tort Distinction
  • p. 122.
  • Assessing Traditionalism
  • p. 123.
  • Subjective and Objective Approaches in Tort Law
  • p. 124.
  • Liberty and Prosperity
  • A
  • Case of Self-Defense
  • p. 124.
  • The
  • Actual Person or the Reasonable Person?
  • p. 125.
  • Subcategorizing
  • p. 127.
  • The
  • Duty to Aid
  • p. 10.
  • p. 128.
  • The
  • Common-Law Approach
  • p. 128.
  • The
  • Ames Rule
  • p. 129.
  • Feinberg and the Right to Assistance
  • p. 130.
  • Epstein and Bright Lines
  • Ancient Liberty
  • p. 132.
  • 5.
  • Criminal Law
  • p. 135.
  • Torts and Crimes
  • p. 135.
  • A
  • Utilitarian Approach
  • p. 135.
  • Bentham's Principle of Utility
  • p. 10.
  • p. 135.
  • The
  • Utilitarian Aims of Punishment
  • p. 136.
  • Criticisms of the Utilitarian Approach
  • p. 137.
  • A
  • Retributivist Approach
  • p. 139.
  • Justice and Desert
  • Liberty and Prosperity in the Modern Era
  • p. 139.
  • Why Punishment Is Deserved
  • p. 140.
  • Criticisms of Retributivism
  • p. 141.
  • The
  • Therapeutic Model
  • p. 144.
  • Rehabilitation, Not Punishment
  • p. 144.
  • The
  • p. 10.
  • Criticisms of the Therapeutic Model
  • p. 145.
  • Amount of Punishment
  • p. 147.
  • A
  • Utilitarian Approach
  • p. 147.
  • Criticisms of the Utilitarian Approach
  • p. 148.
  • A
  • Hobbes and Austin: The Sovereign as Above the Law
  • Retributivist Approach
  • p. 148.
  • Criticisms of Retributivism
  • p. 149.
  • Davis's Version of Retributivism
  • p. 150.
  • Criticisms of Davis
  • p. 151.
  • Mens Rea versus Strict Liability
  • p. 153.
  • p. 12.
  • The
  • Guilty Mind
  • p. 153.
  • Objective and Strict Liability
  • p. 154.
  • Strict Liability: Against
  • p. 155.
  • Strict Liability: For
  • p. 156.
  • Limits of Criminal Law
  • The
  • p. 157.
  • The
  • Public-Private Distinction
  • p. 157.
  • J. S. Mill and the Harm Principle
  • p. 158.
  • The
  • Devlin-Hart Debate
  • p. 161.
  • 6.
  • King versus Parliament
  • Law and Economics
  • p. 170.
  • The
  • Economic Analysis of Law
  • p. 170.
  • Economic Rationality
  • p. 171.
  • Rational Action
  • p. 171.
  • An
  • p. 12.
  • Example: The Rational Athlete
  • p. 172.
  • Rationality and Uncertainty
  • p. 173.
  • Economic Efficiency
  • p. 173.
  • Utilitarianism and Beyond
  • p. 173.
  • Pareto's Concepts of Efficiency
  • p. 174.
  • Philosophical Confusions
  • The
  • Limitations of Pareto's Efficiency Concepts
  • p. 175.
  • Kaldor, Hicks, and Posner
  • p. 176.
  • Scarcity and Efficiency
  • p. 176.
  • The
  • Efficiency of the Common Law
  • p. 177.
  • p. 12.
  • Contract Law
  • p. 177.
  • Negligence and the Hand Formula
  • p. 179.
  • Property
  • p. 180.
  • The
  • Coase Theorem
  • p. 181.
  • An
  • A
  • Efficiency Explanation of Common Law
  • p. 183.
  • Posner's Argument
  • p. 183.
  • Criticisms of Posner
  • p. 184.
  • Social Morality versus Efficiency
  • p. 184.
  • The
  • Scientific Status of Law and Economics
  • Round Square?
  • p. 185.
  • Scientific Method
  • p. 185.
  • Is Law and Economics Scientific?
  • p. 186.
  • The
  • Evaluation of Law: Should Law Maximize Wealth?
  • p. 187.
  • The
  • Biggest Pie?
  • Rule of Law
  • p. 13.
  • p. 187.
  • Other Virtues of Wealth Maximization?
  • p. 188.
  • Wealth Maximization and the Poor
  • p. 189.
  • Political Disagreement in Law and Economics
  • p. 191.
  • What Kind of Market?
  • p. 191.
  • Conservatives versus Liberals
  • Austin's Contribution
  • p. 192.
  • Is Efficiency a Neutral Value?
  • p. 193.
  • The
  • Value of Efficiency
  • p. 194.
  • Dworkin's Critique of Efficiency
  • p. 194.
  • Taking Efficiency Seriously
  • p. 195.
  • p. 14.
  • 7.
  • Feminism and the Law
  • p. 199.
  • Feminism versus the Traditional View of Women
  • p. 199.
  • Woman's Place
  • p. 199.
  • The
  • Feminist Rebellion
  • p. 200.
  • Human Nature
  • Types of Feminism
  • p. 201.
  • Two Central Issues
  • p. 201.
  • Liberals, Radicals, Progressives, and Conservatives
  • p. 202.
  • The
  • Question of Patriarchy
  • p. 203.
  • Discrimination and Oppression
  • p. 15.
  • p. 203.
  • Is Patriarchy a Thing of the Past?
  • p. 204.
  • The
  • Question of Privacy: A Radical View
  • p. 205.
  • The
  • Problems with Privacy
  • p. 206.
  • Fighting "Private" Oppression
  • The
  • p. 206.
  • Women's Labor
  • p. 207.
  • Abortion Rights: Beyond Privacy to Equality
  • p. 208.
  • Abortion and the Indigent
  • p. 208.
  • Equality: Eradicating Women's Oppression
  • p. 209.
  • Abortion Rights: A Liberal View
  • Crooked Timber of Humanity
  • p. 210.
  • Defending the Right of Privacy
  • p. 210.
  • Liberal Equality
  • p. 211.
  • Abortion Rights: The Liberal or Radical Approach?
  • p. 212.
  • The
  • Legal Argument
  • p. 213.
  • p. 16.
  • The
  • Moral Argument
  • p. 214.
  • The
  • Difference Debate
  • p. 215.
  • Pregnancy Benefits
  • p. 216.
  • Special Treatment or Equal Treatment?
  • p. 217.
  • Republican Government
  • Women's Values?
  • p. 219.
  • Pornography: Free Speech and Women's Rights
  • p. 220.
  • A
  • Linchpin of Patriarchy
  • p. 220.
  • Protecting Pornography
  • p. 221.
  • Silencing Women
  • p. 16.
  • p. 222.
  • The
  • Harm of Pornography
  • p. 223.
  • Pornography on Trial: American Booksellers v. Hudnut
  • p. 224.
  • The
  • Ordinance
  • p. 224.
  • The
  • p. 1.
  • Hobbes versus Kant and Madison
  • Ruling: Easterbrook's Opinion
  • p. 226.
  • MacKinnon's Criticisms
  • p. 227.
  • The
  • Psychology of Pornography
  • p. 228.
  • Evidence of Harm?
  • p. 229.
  • Patriarchy Revisited: The Role of Reason
  • p. 17.
  • p. 231.
  • Beyond Statistics
  • p. 231.
  • Is Reason "Male"?
  • p. 233.
  • 8.
  • Race and American Law
  • p. 238.
  • Race, Citizenship, and Identity
  • p. 238.
  • Substantive versus Legal Justice
  • Jim Crow and the One-Drop Rule
  • p. 239.
  • Separate but Equal: The Plessy Case
  • p. 241.
  • A
  • Reasonable Dissent from Plessy: Law and Scientific Racism
  • p. 243.
  • Beyond Separate but Equal: The Brown Case
  • p. 245.
  • The
  • p. 18.
  • Small Steps to Brown
  • p. 245.
  • Brown: Constitutional Equality
  • p. 247.
  • The
  • Civil Rights Revolution
  • p. 249.
  • Beyond Litigation
  • p. 249.
  • Social Agitation: Martin Luther King, Jr. versus George Wallace
  • The
  • p. 250.
  • The
  • Civil Rights Act of 1964
  • p. 252.
  • The
  • Voting Rights Act: Race and Democracy
  • p. 256.
  • The
  • Black Power Movement
  • p. 258.
  • Impeachment Controversy: Background
  • The
  • Idea of Institutional Racism
  • p. 260.
  • Racial Discrimination: Intent versus Disparate Impact
  • p. 261.
  • Critical Race Theory
  • p. 264.
  • Racism and the Rule of Law
  • p. 266.
  • Affirmative Action
  • p. 19.
  • p. 270.
  • The
  • Law and Politics of Affirmative Action
  • p. 270.
  • Individual Rights
  • p. 273
  • Power, Privacy, and Prosecution
  • p. 22.
  • The
  • Impeachment and the Rule of Law
  • Real-World Rule of Law
  • p. 25.
  • Political Trials
  • p. 27.
  • The
  • Impeachment Trial
  • p. 28.
  • Should the Rule of Law Apply?
  • p. 29.
  • The
  • p. 1.
  • Trial of the President
  • p. 29.
  • The
  • Role of Politics
  • p. 32.
  • The
  • Vagueness Problem
  • p. 33.
  • 2.
  • Law and Morality
  • Arbitrary Government and the Principles of Legality
  • p. 40.
  • A
  • Common Saying
  • p. 40.
  • Judgment at Nuremberg
  • p. 43.
  • Historical Background
  • p. 43.
  • Criticisms of the Trial
  • p. 44.
  • p. 3.
  • Justifying the Trial
  • p. 47.
  • Assessing the Trial
  • p. 48.
  • Natural Law Theory: Overview
  • p. 49.
  • Traditional Natural Law Theory: Background
  • p. 50.
  • Aquinas's Theory of Law
  • p. 51.
  • Law, Power, and Hierarchy
  • p. 284.
  • Against the Rule of Law: Politics, Morality, and Law
  • p. 285.
  • Crits, Feminists, and Critical Race Theorists
  • p. 286.
  • Crits and Conservatives
  • p. 287.
  • Legal Reasoning: A Mainstream Account
  • p. 288.
  • Social Effects: Academic Values and Racial Identities
  • Law and Authority
  • p. 288.
  • Law and Reason
  • p. 289.
  • Reasoning: Legal and Practical
  • p. 291.
  • The
  • Doctrine of Precedent: Stare Decisis
  • p. 291.
  • Legal Reasoning: The Attack Begins
  • p. 277.
  • p. 292.
  • Realism and Formalism
  • p. 292.
  • Indeterminacy
  • p. 293.
  • So Long, Stare Decisis
  • p. 294.
  • An
  • Example: Hardwick's Right to Privacy?
  • p. 294.
  • 9.
  • Clusters of Rules
  • p. 295.
  • Justification and Motivation
  • p. 295.
  • Reluctant Realists
  • p. 295.
  • Domesticating Realism
  • p. 297.
  • Legal Reasoning: The Crits Attack
  • p. 297.
  • Critical Legal Studies
  • Law as a Patchwork
  • p. 297.
  • The
  • Contradictions of Private Law
  • p. 299.
  • Law, Liberty, and Liberalism
  • p. 301.
  • Liberalism and the Rule of Law
  • p. 301.
  • Unger and the Contradictions of Liberalism
  • p. 284.
  • p. 302.
  • The
  • Mainstream versus the Crits
  • p. 303.
  • Critics of the Crits
  • p. 303.
  • Dworkin and Legal Reasoning
  • p. 303.
  • The
  • Crits' Response
  • The
  • p. 306.
  • Competition and Contradiction: Dworkin Replies
  • p. 307.
  • The
  • Crits' Last Stand
  • p. 309
  • Crits: An Introduction
  • p. 284.
Control code
43526835
Dimensions
24 cm
Edition
2nd ed
Extent
xxiv, 319 pages
Isbn
9780534543525
Lccn
00025236
Media category
unmediated
Media MARC source
rdamedia
Media type code
  • n
Label
Arguing about law : an introduction to legal philosophy, Andrew Altman
Publication
Copyright
Bibliography note
Includes bibliographical references and index
Carrier category
volume
Carrier category code
  • nc
Carrier MARC source
rdacarrier
Content category
text
Content type code
  • txt
Content type MARC source
rdacontent
Contents
  • Government Under Law
  • Law and the Good
  • p. 51.
  • Assessing Aquinas
  • p. 53.
  • Fuller and Fidelity to Law
  • p. 54.
  • The
  • Inner Morality of Law
  • p. 54.
  • Assessing Fuller's Inner Morality
  • p. 3.
  • p. 56.
  • Law and Social Purpose
  • p. 57.
  • Dworkin's Interpretive Theory
  • p. 58.
  • Rules and Principles: The Idea of Fit
  • p. 58.
  • Fitting the Fourth Amendment: Privacy
  • p. 59.
  • Olmstead and Beyond
  • Government by Rules
  • p. 60.
  • The
  • Role of Morality
  • p. 61.
  • The
  • Challenge of Skepticism
  • p. 62.
  • Assessing Dworkin
  • p. 65.
  • Legal Positivism: Overview
  • p. 4.
  • p. 66.
  • Austin's Theory of Law
  • p. 67.
  • Law as Command
  • p. 67.
  • Assessing Austin
  • p. 69.
  • Hart: Law as Primary and Secondary Rules
  • p. 70.
  • Types of Legal Rules
  • Fair Warning and the Formal Features of Legal Rules
  • p. 70.
  • Legal Obligation: Government and Gunman
  • p. 71.
  • Primary and Secondary Rules
  • p. 72.
  • Assessing Hart
  • p. 73.
  • Summary: Natural Law versus Positivism
  • p. 76.
  • 3.
  • p. 5.
  • The
  • Constitution
  • p. 79.
  • Popular Government and the Rule of Law
  • p. 79.
  • The
  • Undisciplined Public
  • p. 79.
  • The
  • Constitutional Design
  • Due Process
  • p. 80.
  • The
  • "Troublesome" Provisions
  • p. 82.
  • The
  • Supreme Court and Judicial Review
  • p. 84.
  • Jefferson's View
  • p. 84.
  • Judicial Review as Antidemocratic
  • p. 6.
  • p. 85.
  • The
  • Historical Record
  • p. 86.
  • Judicial Self-Restraint
  • p. 86.
  • Judicial Review and the Rule of Law
  • p. 87.
  • The
  • Judiciary as Policeman
  • The
  • p. 87.
  • The
  • Judiciary as Expert Interpreter
  • p. 88.
  • Judicial Review and Democracy
  • p. 89.
  • Ely's Argument: Perfecting Democracy
  • p. 89.
  • Criticisms of Ely: The Political Process
  • p. 91.
  • Power of the People
  • Ackerman's Argument: The Sovereign People
  • p. 91.
  • Criticisms of Ackerman: The Rule of Law
  • p. 93.
  • Constitutional Interpretation: Implicit Rights?
  • p. 94.
  • The
  • Right to Privacy: Griswold v. Connecticut
  • p. 95.
  • Criticisms of Griswold
  • 1.
  • p. 6.
  • p. 96.
  • Framers' Intent
  • p. 97.
  • Original Understanding
  • p. 99.
  • Bork's Theory
  • p. 99.
  • Criticisms of Bork: Naked Power Organs
  • p. 100.
  • Dworkin and the Constitution
  • Corruption
  • p. 102.
  • Criticisms of Dworkin
  • p. 104.
  • Bork versus Dworkin
  • p. 104.
  • Whose Morality?
  • p. 105.
  • Judgment and Action
  • p. 105.
  • The
  • p. 7.
  • Supreme Court versus Society
  • p. 106.
  • 4.
  • Private Law: Torts, Contracts, and Property
  • p. 111.
  • The
  • Functions of Private Law
  • p. 111.
  • The
  • Traditional Public-Private Distinction
  • Vengeance
  • p. 113.
  • Criticisms of the Public-Private Distinction
  • p. 115.
  • Legal Realism and the Politics of Private Law
  • p. 115.
  • Property and Progress: The Labor Injunction
  • p. 116.
  • Assessing the Realist Challenge
  • p. 117.
  • The
  • p. 8.
  • Traditional Contract-Tort Distinction
  • p. 119.
  • Criticisms of the Contract-Tort Distinction
  • p. 120.
  • Defenses of the Contract-Tort Distinction
  • p. 122.
  • Assessing Traditionalism
  • p. 123.
  • Subjective and Objective Approaches in Tort Law
  • p. 124.
  • Liberty and Prosperity
  • A
  • Case of Self-Defense
  • p. 124.
  • The
  • Actual Person or the Reasonable Person?
  • p. 125.
  • Subcategorizing
  • p. 127.
  • The
  • Duty to Aid
  • p. 10.
  • p. 128.
  • The
  • Common-Law Approach
  • p. 128.
  • The
  • Ames Rule
  • p. 129.
  • Feinberg and the Right to Assistance
  • p. 130.
  • Epstein and Bright Lines
  • Ancient Liberty
  • p. 132.
  • 5.
  • Criminal Law
  • p. 135.
  • Torts and Crimes
  • p. 135.
  • A
  • Utilitarian Approach
  • p. 135.
  • Bentham's Principle of Utility
  • p. 10.
  • p. 135.
  • The
  • Utilitarian Aims of Punishment
  • p. 136.
  • Criticisms of the Utilitarian Approach
  • p. 137.
  • A
  • Retributivist Approach
  • p. 139.
  • Justice and Desert
  • Liberty and Prosperity in the Modern Era
  • p. 139.
  • Why Punishment Is Deserved
  • p. 140.
  • Criticisms of Retributivism
  • p. 141.
  • The
  • Therapeutic Model
  • p. 144.
  • Rehabilitation, Not Punishment
  • p. 144.
  • The
  • p. 10.
  • Criticisms of the Therapeutic Model
  • p. 145.
  • Amount of Punishment
  • p. 147.
  • A
  • Utilitarian Approach
  • p. 147.
  • Criticisms of the Utilitarian Approach
  • p. 148.
  • A
  • Hobbes and Austin: The Sovereign as Above the Law
  • Retributivist Approach
  • p. 148.
  • Criticisms of Retributivism
  • p. 149.
  • Davis's Version of Retributivism
  • p. 150.
  • Criticisms of Davis
  • p. 151.
  • Mens Rea versus Strict Liability
  • p. 153.
  • p. 12.
  • The
  • Guilty Mind
  • p. 153.
  • Objective and Strict Liability
  • p. 154.
  • Strict Liability: Against
  • p. 155.
  • Strict Liability: For
  • p. 156.
  • Limits of Criminal Law
  • The
  • p. 157.
  • The
  • Public-Private Distinction
  • p. 157.
  • J. S. Mill and the Harm Principle
  • p. 158.
  • The
  • Devlin-Hart Debate
  • p. 161.
  • 6.
  • King versus Parliament
  • Law and Economics
  • p. 170.
  • The
  • Economic Analysis of Law
  • p. 170.
  • Economic Rationality
  • p. 171.
  • Rational Action
  • p. 171.
  • An
  • p. 12.
  • Example: The Rational Athlete
  • p. 172.
  • Rationality and Uncertainty
  • p. 173.
  • Economic Efficiency
  • p. 173.
  • Utilitarianism and Beyond
  • p. 173.
  • Pareto's Concepts of Efficiency
  • p. 174.
  • Philosophical Confusions
  • The
  • Limitations of Pareto's Efficiency Concepts
  • p. 175.
  • Kaldor, Hicks, and Posner
  • p. 176.
  • Scarcity and Efficiency
  • p. 176.
  • The
  • Efficiency of the Common Law
  • p. 177.
  • p. 12.
  • Contract Law
  • p. 177.
  • Negligence and the Hand Formula
  • p. 179.
  • Property
  • p. 180.
  • The
  • Coase Theorem
  • p. 181.
  • An
  • A
  • Efficiency Explanation of Common Law
  • p. 183.
  • Posner's Argument
  • p. 183.
  • Criticisms of Posner
  • p. 184.
  • Social Morality versus Efficiency
  • p. 184.
  • The
  • Scientific Status of Law and Economics
  • Round Square?
  • p. 185.
  • Scientific Method
  • p. 185.
  • Is Law and Economics Scientific?
  • p. 186.
  • The
  • Evaluation of Law: Should Law Maximize Wealth?
  • p. 187.
  • The
  • Biggest Pie?
  • Rule of Law
  • p. 13.
  • p. 187.
  • Other Virtues of Wealth Maximization?
  • p. 188.
  • Wealth Maximization and the Poor
  • p. 189.
  • Political Disagreement in Law and Economics
  • p. 191.
  • What Kind of Market?
  • p. 191.
  • Conservatives versus Liberals
  • Austin's Contribution
  • p. 192.
  • Is Efficiency a Neutral Value?
  • p. 193.
  • The
  • Value of Efficiency
  • p. 194.
  • Dworkin's Critique of Efficiency
  • p. 194.
  • Taking Efficiency Seriously
  • p. 195.
  • p. 14.
  • 7.
  • Feminism and the Law
  • p. 199.
  • Feminism versus the Traditional View of Women
  • p. 199.
  • Woman's Place
  • p. 199.
  • The
  • Feminist Rebellion
  • p. 200.
  • Human Nature
  • Types of Feminism
  • p. 201.
  • Two Central Issues
  • p. 201.
  • Liberals, Radicals, Progressives, and Conservatives
  • p. 202.
  • The
  • Question of Patriarchy
  • p. 203.
  • Discrimination and Oppression
  • p. 15.
  • p. 203.
  • Is Patriarchy a Thing of the Past?
  • p. 204.
  • The
  • Question of Privacy: A Radical View
  • p. 205.
  • The
  • Problems with Privacy
  • p. 206.
  • Fighting "Private" Oppression
  • The
  • p. 206.
  • Women's Labor
  • p. 207.
  • Abortion Rights: Beyond Privacy to Equality
  • p. 208.
  • Abortion and the Indigent
  • p. 208.
  • Equality: Eradicating Women's Oppression
  • p. 209.
  • Abortion Rights: A Liberal View
  • Crooked Timber of Humanity
  • p. 210.
  • Defending the Right of Privacy
  • p. 210.
  • Liberal Equality
  • p. 211.
  • Abortion Rights: The Liberal or Radical Approach?
  • p. 212.
  • The
  • Legal Argument
  • p. 213.
  • p. 16.
  • The
  • Moral Argument
  • p. 214.
  • The
  • Difference Debate
  • p. 215.
  • Pregnancy Benefits
  • p. 216.
  • Special Treatment or Equal Treatment?
  • p. 217.
  • Republican Government
  • Women's Values?
  • p. 219.
  • Pornography: Free Speech and Women's Rights
  • p. 220.
  • A
  • Linchpin of Patriarchy
  • p. 220.
  • Protecting Pornography
  • p. 221.
  • Silencing Women
  • p. 16.
  • p. 222.
  • The
  • Harm of Pornography
  • p. 223.
  • Pornography on Trial: American Booksellers v. Hudnut
  • p. 224.
  • The
  • Ordinance
  • p. 224.
  • The
  • p. 1.
  • Hobbes versus Kant and Madison
  • Ruling: Easterbrook's Opinion
  • p. 226.
  • MacKinnon's Criticisms
  • p. 227.
  • The
  • Psychology of Pornography
  • p. 228.
  • Evidence of Harm?
  • p. 229.
  • Patriarchy Revisited: The Role of Reason
  • p. 17.
  • p. 231.
  • Beyond Statistics
  • p. 231.
  • Is Reason "Male"?
  • p. 233.
  • 8.
  • Race and American Law
  • p. 238.
  • Race, Citizenship, and Identity
  • p. 238.
  • Substantive versus Legal Justice
  • Jim Crow and the One-Drop Rule
  • p. 239.
  • Separate but Equal: The Plessy Case
  • p. 241.
  • A
  • Reasonable Dissent from Plessy: Law and Scientific Racism
  • p. 243.
  • Beyond Separate but Equal: The Brown Case
  • p. 245.
  • The
  • p. 18.
  • Small Steps to Brown
  • p. 245.
  • Brown: Constitutional Equality
  • p. 247.
  • The
  • Civil Rights Revolution
  • p. 249.
  • Beyond Litigation
  • p. 249.
  • Social Agitation: Martin Luther King, Jr. versus George Wallace
  • The
  • p. 250.
  • The
  • Civil Rights Act of 1964
  • p. 252.
  • The
  • Voting Rights Act: Race and Democracy
  • p. 256.
  • The
  • Black Power Movement
  • p. 258.
  • Impeachment Controversy: Background
  • The
  • Idea of Institutional Racism
  • p. 260.
  • Racial Discrimination: Intent versus Disparate Impact
  • p. 261.
  • Critical Race Theory
  • p. 264.
  • Racism and the Rule of Law
  • p. 266.
  • Affirmative Action
  • p. 19.
  • p. 270.
  • The
  • Law and Politics of Affirmative Action
  • p. 270.
  • Individual Rights
  • p. 273
  • Power, Privacy, and Prosecution
  • p. 22.
  • The
  • Impeachment and the Rule of Law
  • Real-World Rule of Law
  • p. 25.
  • Political Trials
  • p. 27.
  • The
  • Impeachment Trial
  • p. 28.
  • Should the Rule of Law Apply?
  • p. 29.
  • The
  • p. 1.
  • Trial of the President
  • p. 29.
  • The
  • Role of Politics
  • p. 32.
  • The
  • Vagueness Problem
  • p. 33.
  • 2.
  • Law and Morality
  • Arbitrary Government and the Principles of Legality
  • p. 40.
  • A
  • Common Saying
  • p. 40.
  • Judgment at Nuremberg
  • p. 43.
  • Historical Background
  • p. 43.
  • Criticisms of the Trial
  • p. 44.
  • p. 3.
  • Justifying the Trial
  • p. 47.
  • Assessing the Trial
  • p. 48.
  • Natural Law Theory: Overview
  • p. 49.
  • Traditional Natural Law Theory: Background
  • p. 50.
  • Aquinas's Theory of Law
  • p. 51.
  • Law, Power, and Hierarchy
  • p. 284.
  • Against the Rule of Law: Politics, Morality, and Law
  • p. 285.
  • Crits, Feminists, and Critical Race Theorists
  • p. 286.
  • Crits and Conservatives
  • p. 287.
  • Legal Reasoning: A Mainstream Account
  • p. 288.
  • Social Effects: Academic Values and Racial Identities
  • Law and Authority
  • p. 288.
  • Law and Reason
  • p. 289.
  • Reasoning: Legal and Practical
  • p. 291.
  • The
  • Doctrine of Precedent: Stare Decisis
  • p. 291.
  • Legal Reasoning: The Attack Begins
  • p. 277.
  • p. 292.
  • Realism and Formalism
  • p. 292.
  • Indeterminacy
  • p. 293.
  • So Long, Stare Decisis
  • p. 294.
  • An
  • Example: Hardwick's Right to Privacy?
  • p. 294.
  • 9.
  • Clusters of Rules
  • p. 295.
  • Justification and Motivation
  • p. 295.
  • Reluctant Realists
  • p. 295.
  • Domesticating Realism
  • p. 297.
  • Legal Reasoning: The Crits Attack
  • p. 297.
  • Critical Legal Studies
  • Law as a Patchwork
  • p. 297.
  • The
  • Contradictions of Private Law
  • p. 299.
  • Law, Liberty, and Liberalism
  • p. 301.
  • Liberalism and the Rule of Law
  • p. 301.
  • Unger and the Contradictions of Liberalism
  • p. 284.
  • p. 302.
  • The
  • Mainstream versus the Crits
  • p. 303.
  • Critics of the Crits
  • p. 303.
  • Dworkin and Legal Reasoning
  • p. 303.
  • The
  • Crits' Response
  • The
  • p. 306.
  • Competition and Contradiction: Dworkin Replies
  • p. 307.
  • The
  • Crits' Last Stand
  • p. 309
  • Crits: An Introduction
  • p. 284.
Control code
43526835
Dimensions
24 cm
Edition
2nd ed
Extent
xxiv, 319 pages
Isbn
9780534543525
Lccn
00025236
Media category
unmediated
Media MARC source
rdamedia
Media type code
  • n

Library Locations

    • Pardee Legal Research CenterBorrow it
      5998 Alcalá Park, San Diego, CA, 92110-2492, US
      32.771471 -117.187496
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