The Resource Credible commitment to optimal escape from a liquidity trap : the role of the balance sheet of an independent central bank, prepared by Olivier Jeanne and Lars E.O. Svensson
Credible commitment to optimal escape from a liquidity trap : the role of the balance sheet of an independent central bank, prepared by Olivier Jeanne and Lars E.O. Svensson
Resource Information
The item Credible commitment to optimal escape from a liquidity trap : the role of the balance sheet of an independent central bank, prepared by Olivier Jeanne and Lars E.O. Svensson represents a specific, individual, material embodiment of a distinct intellectual or artistic creation found in University of San Diego Libraries.This item is available to borrow from 1 library branch.
Resource Information
The item Credible commitment to optimal escape from a liquidity trap : the role of the balance sheet of an independent central bank, prepared by Olivier Jeanne and Lars E.O. Svensson represents a specific, individual, material embodiment of a distinct intellectual or artistic creation found in University of San Diego Libraries.
This item is available to borrow from 1 library branch.
- Summary
- An independent central bank can manage its balance sheet and its capital so as to commit itself to a depreciation of its currency and an exchange rate peg. This way, the central bank can implement the optimal escape from a liquidity trap, which involves a commitment to higher future inflation. This commitment mechanism works even though, realistically, the central bank cannot commit itself to a particular future money supply. It supports the feasibility of Svensson's Foolproof Way to escape from a liquidity trap
- Language
- eng
- Extent
- 1 online resource (43 pages)
- Contents
-
- ""Contents""; ""I. INTRODUCTION""; ""II. A SIMPLE OPEN ECONOMY MODEL OF THE LIQUIDITY TRAP""; ""A. The Structure of the Economy""; ""B. Equilibrium Relationships""; ""C. Productivity""; ""D. Monetary Policy""; ""E. A Liquidity Trap in Period 1""; ""F. The Optimal Policy Under Commitment""; ""G. Implementing the Commitment Equilibrium""; ""III. THE BALANCE- SHEET CONCERNS OF CENTRAL BANKS""; ""IV. HOW AN INDEPENDENT CENTRAL BANK CAN COMMIT TO A FUTURE PRICE LEVEL""; ""V. GENERALIZATIONS""; ""A. A Multiperiod Liquidity Trap""; ""B. Generalizing the Capital Constraint""
- ""C. Pegging the Price of Other Assets than Foreign Exchange""""VI. CONCLUSIONS""; ""Appendices""; ""I. First-Order Conditions""; ""II. Derivation of Equation (12)""; ""III. Households and Firms Perceiving a Positive Probability of a Liquidity Trap""; ""IV. Central-Bank Assets Including Domestic Credit""; ""REFERENCES""
- Isbn
- 9781451903065
- Label
- Credible commitment to optimal escape from a liquidity trap : the role of the balance sheet of an independent central bank
- Title
- Credible commitment to optimal escape from a liquidity trap
- Title remainder
- the role of the balance sheet of an independent central bank
- Statement of responsibility
- prepared by Olivier Jeanne and Lars E.O. Svensson
- Language
- eng
- Summary
- An independent central bank can manage its balance sheet and its capital so as to commit itself to a depreciation of its currency and an exchange rate peg. This way, the central bank can implement the optimal escape from a liquidity trap, which involves a commitment to higher future inflation. This commitment mechanism works even though, realistically, the central bank cannot commit itself to a particular future money supply. It supports the feasibility of Svensson's Foolproof Way to escape from a liquidity trap
- Action
- digitized
- Cataloging source
- OCLCE
- http://bibfra.me/vocab/lite/collectionName
- IMF eLibrary
- http://library.link/vocab/creatorName
- Jeanne, Olivier
- Illustrations
- illustrations
- Index
- no index present
- LC call number
- HG3881.5.I58
- LC item number
- W67 no.04/162 ONLINE
- Literary form
- non fiction
- Nature of contents
-
- dictionaries
- bibliography
- http://library.link/vocab/relatedWorkOrContributorName
-
- Svensson, Lars E. O.
- International Monetary Fund
- Series statement
- IMF Working Paper,
- Series volume
- WP/04/162
- http://library.link/vocab/subjectName
-
- Bank liquidity
- Banks and banking, Central
- Deflation (Finance)
- Bank liquidity
- Interest rates
- Bank liquidity
- Banks and banking, Central
- Deflation (Finance)
- Interest rates
- Label
- Credible commitment to optimal escape from a liquidity trap : the role of the balance sheet of an independent central bank, prepared by Olivier Jeanne and Lars E.O. Svensson
- Antecedent source
- file reproduced from original
- Bibliography note
- Includes bibliographical references
- Carrier category
- online resource
- Carrier category code
-
- cr
- Carrier MARC source
- rdacarrier
- Color
- black and white
- Content category
- text
- Content type code
-
- txt
- Content type MARC source
- rdacontent
- Contents
-
- ""Contents""; ""I. INTRODUCTION""; ""II. A SIMPLE OPEN ECONOMY MODEL OF THE LIQUIDITY TRAP""; ""A. The Structure of the Economy""; ""B. Equilibrium Relationships""; ""C. Productivity""; ""D. Monetary Policy""; ""E. A Liquidity Trap in Period 1""; ""F. The Optimal Policy Under Commitment""; ""G. Implementing the Commitment Equilibrium""; ""III. THE BALANCE- SHEET CONCERNS OF CENTRAL BANKS""; ""IV. HOW AN INDEPENDENT CENTRAL BANK CAN COMMIT TO A FUTURE PRICE LEVEL""; ""V. GENERALIZATIONS""; ""A. A Multiperiod Liquidity Trap""; ""B. Generalizing the Capital Constraint""
- ""C. Pegging the Price of Other Assets than Foreign Exchange""""VI. CONCLUSIONS""; ""Appendices""; ""I. First-Order Conditions""; ""II. Derivation of Equation (12)""; ""III. Households and Firms Perceiving a Positive Probability of a Liquidity Trap""; ""IV. Central-Bank Assets Including Domestic Credit""; ""REFERENCES""
- Control code
- 646975131
- Dimensions
- unknown
- Extent
- 1 online resource (43 pages)
- Form of item
- online
- Isbn
- 9781451903065
- Issn
- 2227-8885
- Level of compression
-
- lossless
- lossy
- Media category
- computer
- Media MARC source
- rdamedia
- Media type code
-
- c
- Other control number
- 10.5089/9781451903065.001
- Other physical details
- illustrations
- Reformatting quality
-
- preservation
- access
- Reproduction note
- Electronic reproduction.
- Specific material designation
- remote
- System control number
-
- imfWPIEA1622004
- (IMF)WPIEA1622004
- (OCoLC)646975131
- System details
- Master and use copy. Digital master created according to Benchmark for Faithful Digital Reproductions of Monographs and Serials, Version 1. Digital Library Federation, December 2002.
- Label
- Credible commitment to optimal escape from a liquidity trap : the role of the balance sheet of an independent central bank, prepared by Olivier Jeanne and Lars E.O. Svensson
- Antecedent source
- file reproduced from original
- Bibliography note
- Includes bibliographical references
- Carrier category
- online resource
- Carrier category code
-
- cr
- Carrier MARC source
- rdacarrier
- Color
- black and white
- Content category
- text
- Content type code
-
- txt
- Content type MARC source
- rdacontent
- Contents
-
- ""Contents""; ""I. INTRODUCTION""; ""II. A SIMPLE OPEN ECONOMY MODEL OF THE LIQUIDITY TRAP""; ""A. The Structure of the Economy""; ""B. Equilibrium Relationships""; ""C. Productivity""; ""D. Monetary Policy""; ""E. A Liquidity Trap in Period 1""; ""F. The Optimal Policy Under Commitment""; ""G. Implementing the Commitment Equilibrium""; ""III. THE BALANCE- SHEET CONCERNS OF CENTRAL BANKS""; ""IV. HOW AN INDEPENDENT CENTRAL BANK CAN COMMIT TO A FUTURE PRICE LEVEL""; ""V. GENERALIZATIONS""; ""A. A Multiperiod Liquidity Trap""; ""B. Generalizing the Capital Constraint""
- ""C. Pegging the Price of Other Assets than Foreign Exchange""""VI. CONCLUSIONS""; ""Appendices""; ""I. First-Order Conditions""; ""II. Derivation of Equation (12)""; ""III. Households and Firms Perceiving a Positive Probability of a Liquidity Trap""; ""IV. Central-Bank Assets Including Domestic Credit""; ""REFERENCES""
- Control code
- 646975131
- Dimensions
- unknown
- Extent
- 1 online resource (43 pages)
- Form of item
- online
- Isbn
- 9781451903065
- Issn
- 2227-8885
- Level of compression
-
- lossless
- lossy
- Media category
- computer
- Media MARC source
- rdamedia
- Media type code
-
- c
- Other control number
- 10.5089/9781451903065.001
- Other physical details
- illustrations
- Reformatting quality
-
- preservation
- access
- Reproduction note
- Electronic reproduction.
- Specific material designation
- remote
- System control number
-
- imfWPIEA1622004
- (IMF)WPIEA1622004
- (OCoLC)646975131
- System details
- Master and use copy. Digital master created according to Benchmark for Faithful Digital Reproductions of Monographs and Serials, Version 1. Digital Library Federation, December 2002.
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<div class="citation" vocab="http://schema.org/"><i class="fa fa-external-link-square fa-fw"></i> Data from <span resource="http://link.sandiego.edu/portal/Credible-commitment-to-optimal-escape-from-a/-jM-YyNoK3g/" typeof="Book http://bibfra.me/vocab/lite/Item"><span property="name http://bibfra.me/vocab/lite/label"><a href="http://link.sandiego.edu/portal/Credible-commitment-to-optimal-escape-from-a/-jM-YyNoK3g/">Credible commitment to optimal escape from a liquidity trap : the role of the balance sheet of an independent central bank, prepared by Olivier Jeanne and Lars E.O. Svensson</a></span> - <span property="potentialAction" typeOf="OrganizeAction"><span property="agent" typeof="LibrarySystem http://library.link/vocab/LibrarySystem" resource="http://link.sandiego.edu/"><span property="name http://bibfra.me/vocab/lite/label"><a property="url" href="http://link.sandiego.edu/">University of San Diego Libraries</a></span></span></span></span></div>
