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The Resource Deterring Rational Fanatics

Deterring Rational Fanatics

Label
Deterring Rational Fanatics
Title
Deterring Rational Fanatics
Creator
Subject
Genre
Language
eng
Summary
Cold War-era strategic thinking was driven by the belief that individuals, organizations, and foreign states could be deterred from offensive action by the threat of reprisal. That assurance was shaken with the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001; suddenly, it seemed that no threat was powerful enough to deter individuals or organizations that valued political objectives over their own lives and the lives of their members. More than a decade later, new research and theory are bringing deterrence back into currency as a viable counterterrorism strategy. Alex S. Wilner updates deterrence theory for conflict in the twenty-first century, arguing for its value against challengers such as rogue states, cyber warriors, and transnational terrorist organizations. Deterring Rational Fanatics provides a full-scale discussion of deterrence theory concepts and controversies, assessing the utility of relying on the logic of deterrence and coercion to counter contemporary terrorism. In particular, targeted killings directed against the Taliban of Afghanistan provide a vivid illustration of the impact deterrence can have on militant behavior: precision strikes that eliminate militant leaders represent a significant cost to planning and participating in political violence, a cost that can coerce, manipulate, and alter behavior. Though deterrence theory is not a panacea for terrorism, insurgency, or militancy, it can serve as a strategic guide for state responses; as Wilner shows, terrorist violence can indeed be deterred. --Provided by publisher
Cataloging source
CDX
http://library.link/vocab/creatorName
Wilner, Alex S
Index
index present
Literary form
non fiction
Nature of contents
  • dictionaries
  • bibliography
http://library.link/vocab/subjectName
  • Terrorism
  • Deterrence (Strategy)
  • POLITICAL SCIENCE
  • Deterrence (Strategy)
  • Terrorism
Label
Deterring Rational Fanatics
Instantiates
Publication
Bibliography note
Includes bibliographical references (pages 201-243) and index
Carrier category
online resource
Carrier category code
  • cr
Carrier MARC source
rdacarrier
Content category
text
Content type code
  • txt
Content type MARC source
rdacontent
Contents
Deterrence theory: exploring core concepts -- Deterring terrorism: contemporary debates -- Targeted killings: theory, practice, and consequence -- Targeting the Taliban: coercive lessons from Afghanistan -- Moving ahead with deterrence theory
Control code
ocn903891685
Dimensions
unknown
Extent
1 online resource
Form of item
online
Isbn
9780812292046
Media category
computer
Media MARC source
rdamedia
Media type code
  • c
Note
JSTOR
Other control number
10.9783/9780812292046
http://library.link/vocab/ext/overdrive/overdriveId
  • 691791
  • 22573/ctt136nxsb
Specific material designation
remote
System control number
(OCoLC)903891685
Label
Deterring Rational Fanatics
Publication
Bibliography note
Includes bibliographical references (pages 201-243) and index
Carrier category
online resource
Carrier category code
  • cr
Carrier MARC source
rdacarrier
Content category
text
Content type code
  • txt
Content type MARC source
rdacontent
Contents
Deterrence theory: exploring core concepts -- Deterring terrorism: contemporary debates -- Targeted killings: theory, practice, and consequence -- Targeting the Taliban: coercive lessons from Afghanistan -- Moving ahead with deterrence theory
Control code
ocn903891685
Dimensions
unknown
Extent
1 online resource
Form of item
online
Isbn
9780812292046
Media category
computer
Media MARC source
rdamedia
Media type code
  • c
Note
JSTOR
Other control number
10.9783/9780812292046
http://library.link/vocab/ext/overdrive/overdriveId
  • 691791
  • 22573/ctt136nxsb
Specific material designation
remote
System control number
(OCoLC)903891685

Library Locations

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      32.771354 -117.193327
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