Coverart for item
The Resource Governing for the long term : democracy and the politics of investment, Alan M. Jacobs, (electronic resource)

Governing for the long term : democracy and the politics of investment, Alan M. Jacobs, (electronic resource)

Label
Governing for the long term : democracy and the politics of investment
Title
Governing for the long term
Title remainder
democracy and the politics of investment
Statement of responsibility
Alan M. Jacobs
Creator
Contributor
Subject
Genre
Language
eng
Summary
  • "This book examines how democratic governments manage long-term policy challenges, asking how elected politicians choose between providing policy benefits in the present and investing in the future"--
  • "In Governing for the Long Term, Alan M. Jacobs investigates the conditions under which elected governments invest in long-term social benefits at short-term social cost. Jacobs contends that, along the path to adoption, investment-oriented policies must surmount three distinct hurdles to future-oriented state action: a problem of electoral risk, rooted in the scarcity of voter attention; a problem of prediction, deriving from the complexity of long-term policy effects; and a problem of institutional capacity, arising from interest groups' preferences for distributive gains over intertemporal bargains. Testing this argument through a four-country historical analysis of pension policymaking, the book illuminates crucial differences between the causal logics of distributive and intertemporal politics and makes a case for bringing trade-offs over time to the center of the study of policymaking"--
Assigning source
  • Provided by publisher
  • Provided by publisher
Cataloging source
MiAaPQ
http://library.link/vocab/creatorName
Jacobs, Alan M
Illustrations
illustrations
Index
index present
Literary form
non fiction
Nature of contents
  • dictionaries
  • bibliography
http://library.link/vocab/relatedWorkOrContributorName
ProQuest (Firm)
http://library.link/vocab/subjectName
  • Social policy
  • Social choice
  • Political planning
  • Welfare economics
  • Externalities (Economics)
  • Pensions
Label
Governing for the long term : democracy and the politics of investment, Alan M. Jacobs, (electronic resource)
Instantiates
Publication
Bibliography note
Includes bibliographical references and index
Color
multicolored
Contents
Machine generated contents note: Part I. Problem and Theory: 1. The politics of when; 2. Theorizing intertemporal policy choice; Part II. Programmatic Origins: Intertemporal Choice in Pension Design: 3. Investing in the state: the origins of German pensions, 1889; 4. The politics of mistrust: the origins of British pensions, 1925; 5. Investments as political constraint: the origins of US pensions, 1935; 6. Investing for the short term: the origins of Canadian pensions, 1965; Part III. Programmatic Change: Intertemporal Choice in Pension Reform: 7. Investment as last resort: reforming US pensions, 1977 and 1983; 8. Shifting the long-run burden: reforming British pensions, 1986; 9. Committing to investment: reforming Canadian pensions, 1998; 10. Constrained by uncertainty: reforming German pensions, 1989 and 2001; Part IV. Conclusion: 11. Understanding the politics of the long term
Control code
EBC691877
Dimensions
unknown
Extent
xv, 306 p.
Form of item
  • online
  • electronic
Other physical details
ill
Reproduction note
Electronic reproduction. Ann Arbor, MI : ProQuest, 2015. Available via World Wide Web. Access may be limited to ProQuest affiliated libraries
Specific material designation
remote
System control number
  • (MiAaPQ)EBC691877
  • (Au-PeEL)EBL691877
  • (CaPaEBR)ebr10470675
  • (CaONFJC)MIL311093
  • (OCoLC)726734769
Label
Governing for the long term : democracy and the politics of investment, Alan M. Jacobs, (electronic resource)
Publication
Bibliography note
Includes bibliographical references and index
Color
multicolored
Contents
Machine generated contents note: Part I. Problem and Theory: 1. The politics of when; 2. Theorizing intertemporal policy choice; Part II. Programmatic Origins: Intertemporal Choice in Pension Design: 3. Investing in the state: the origins of German pensions, 1889; 4. The politics of mistrust: the origins of British pensions, 1925; 5. Investments as political constraint: the origins of US pensions, 1935; 6. Investing for the short term: the origins of Canadian pensions, 1965; Part III. Programmatic Change: Intertemporal Choice in Pension Reform: 7. Investment as last resort: reforming US pensions, 1977 and 1983; 8. Shifting the long-run burden: reforming British pensions, 1986; 9. Committing to investment: reforming Canadian pensions, 1998; 10. Constrained by uncertainty: reforming German pensions, 1989 and 2001; Part IV. Conclusion: 11. Understanding the politics of the long term
Control code
EBC691877
Dimensions
unknown
Extent
xv, 306 p.
Form of item
  • online
  • electronic
Other physical details
ill
Reproduction note
Electronic reproduction. Ann Arbor, MI : ProQuest, 2015. Available via World Wide Web. Access may be limited to ProQuest affiliated libraries
Specific material designation
remote
System control number
  • (MiAaPQ)EBC691877
  • (Au-PeEL)EBL691877
  • (CaPaEBR)ebr10470675
  • (CaONFJC)MIL311093
  • (OCoLC)726734769

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