The Resource Nuclear disarmament verification : survey of verification mechanisms, [Tim Caughley]

Nuclear disarmament verification : survey of verification mechanisms, [Tim Caughley]

Label
Nuclear disarmament verification : survey of verification mechanisms
Title
Nuclear disarmament verification
Title remainder
survey of verification mechanisms
Statement of responsibility
[Tim Caughley]
Creator
Contributor
Author
Subject
Genre
Language
eng
Summary
"The objective of this survey is to provide a general overview of past and present verification activities and proposals relevant to the elimination of nuclear weapons. We look beyond the current debate on nuclear disarmament towards the development of the mechanisms required to provide assurances that a nuclear-weapon-free world can be achieved and maintained. Reaching these objectives will be challenging, but, as the paper shows, feasible."--Page 4 of cover
Member of
Cataloging source
DOS
http://bibfra.me/vocab/lite/collectionName
HeinOnline United Nations Law Collection
http://library.link/vocab/creatorName
Caughley, Tim
Government publication
international or intergovernmental publication
Index
no index present
http://bibfra.me/vocab/relation/issuomgbody
u-jIG4z1PXY
LC call number
JZ5665
LC item number
.C384 2016 ONLINE
Literary form
non fiction
Nature of contents
  • dictionaries
  • bibliography
http://library.link/vocab/relatedWorkOrContributorName
United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research
Series statement
UNIDIR resources
http://library.link/vocab/subjectName
  • Nuclear disarmament
  • Disarmament
  • Nuclear arms control
  • Disarmament
  • Nuclear arms control
  • Nuclear disarmament
Label
Nuclear disarmament verification : survey of verification mechanisms, [Tim Caughley]
Instantiates
Publication
Copyright
Bibliography note
Includes bibliographical references (pages 40-45)
Carrier category
online resource
Carrier category code
  • cr
Carrier MARC source
rdacarrier
Content category
text
Content type code
  • txt
Content type MARC source
rdacontent
Contents
  • 2.
  • 4.3.
  • Pre-negotiation bodies
  • 4.4.
  • Confidence-building
  • 4.5.
  • Transparency
  • 4.6.
  • Baseline declarations
  • 4.7.
  • Intrusiveness: maintaining confidentiality
  • Explaining verification
  • 4.8.
  • Technical feasibility
  • 4.9.
  • Experience and expertise
  • 4.10.
  • Scope: nuclear lifecycle
  • 4.11.
  • Collaboration between nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States
  • 4.12.
  • Collaboration among nuclear-weapon States
  • 2.1.
  • 4.13.
  • Collaboration among non-nuclear-weapon States
  • 4.14.
  • Considerations of equity
  • 4.15.
  • Costs
  • 4.16.
  • Choice of institution: existing or new?
  • 4.17.
  • Time
  • Summary
  • 5.
  • Conclusion
  • 6.
  • Bibliography
  • 2.2.
  • Verification
  • 2.3.
  • Role of verification
  • 2.4.
  • Forms and methods of verification
  • Executive summary
  • 2.5.
  • Other relevant terms
  • 2.5.1.
  • Baseline declarations
  • 2.5.2.
  • Challenge inspections
  • 2.5.3.
  • Fissile material
  • 2.5.4.
  • Nuclear disarmament
  • 1.
  • 2.5.5.
  • Safeguards
  • 3.
  • Verification mechanisms overview
  • 3.1.
  • Summary
  • 3.2.
  • Recent projects, proposals, international meetings and other collaborations
  • 3.2.1.
  • United Kingdom-Norway Initiative (UK-NI)
  • The
  • 3.2.2.
  • The
  • International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification (IPNDV)
  • 3.2.3.
  • Nuclear Threat Initiative's Verification Pilot Project (NTI Project)
  • 3.2.4.
  • United Kingdom-United States Technical Cooperation Programme
  • 3.2.5.
  • Trilateral Initiative
  • 3.2.6.
  • multilateral context: 'Taking forward nuclear disarmament'
  • Fissile Material Prohibition Treaty (FMT)/(FM(C)T)--
  • 3.3.
  • Legally binding treaties and other relevant arrangements and initiatives
  • 3.3.1.
  • Summary
  • 3.3.2.
  • Bacteriological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC)
  • 3.3.3.
  • Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)
  • 3.3.4.
  • 1.1.
  • Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT)
  • 3.3.5.
  • Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)
  • 3.3.6.
  • IAEA safeguards
  • 3.3.7.
  • Nuclear-weapon-free zones (NWFZs)
  • 3.3.8.
  • United-States-Russian Federation bilateral collaboration
  • 3.3.9.
  • Summary
  • Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC)
  • 3.3.10.
  • European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM)
  • 3.3.11.
  • Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty
  • 3.3.12.
  • Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty
  • 3.3.13.
  • Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA): Islamic Republic of Iran
  • 3.4.
  • 1.2.
  • The
  • United Nations and verification Issues
  • 3.4.1.
  • Security Council
  • 3.4.2.
  • General Assembly
  • 3.4.3.
  • Secretary-General
  • 3.4.4.
  • Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG) 2016
  • Introduction
  • 3.4.5.
  • Draft Model Convention on Nuclear Weapons
  • 3.4.6.
  • Fissile Material Group of Government Experts
  • 4.
  • Key verification challenges and analogies
  • 4.1.
  • Summary
  • 4.2.
  • General
Control code
965549323
Extent
1 online resource (45 pages)
Form of item
online
Media category
computer
Media MARC source
rdamedia
Media type code
  • c
Specific material designation
remote
System control number
(OCoLC)965549323
Label
Nuclear disarmament verification : survey of verification mechanisms, [Tim Caughley]
Publication
Copyright
Bibliography note
Includes bibliographical references (pages 40-45)
Carrier category
online resource
Carrier category code
  • cr
Carrier MARC source
rdacarrier
Content category
text
Content type code
  • txt
Content type MARC source
rdacontent
Contents
  • 2.
  • 4.3.
  • Pre-negotiation bodies
  • 4.4.
  • Confidence-building
  • 4.5.
  • Transparency
  • 4.6.
  • Baseline declarations
  • 4.7.
  • Intrusiveness: maintaining confidentiality
  • Explaining verification
  • 4.8.
  • Technical feasibility
  • 4.9.
  • Experience and expertise
  • 4.10.
  • Scope: nuclear lifecycle
  • 4.11.
  • Collaboration between nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States
  • 4.12.
  • Collaboration among nuclear-weapon States
  • 2.1.
  • 4.13.
  • Collaboration among non-nuclear-weapon States
  • 4.14.
  • Considerations of equity
  • 4.15.
  • Costs
  • 4.16.
  • Choice of institution: existing or new?
  • 4.17.
  • Time
  • Summary
  • 5.
  • Conclusion
  • 6.
  • Bibliography
  • 2.2.
  • Verification
  • 2.3.
  • Role of verification
  • 2.4.
  • Forms and methods of verification
  • Executive summary
  • 2.5.
  • Other relevant terms
  • 2.5.1.
  • Baseline declarations
  • 2.5.2.
  • Challenge inspections
  • 2.5.3.
  • Fissile material
  • 2.5.4.
  • Nuclear disarmament
  • 1.
  • 2.5.5.
  • Safeguards
  • 3.
  • Verification mechanisms overview
  • 3.1.
  • Summary
  • 3.2.
  • Recent projects, proposals, international meetings and other collaborations
  • 3.2.1.
  • United Kingdom-Norway Initiative (UK-NI)
  • The
  • 3.2.2.
  • The
  • International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification (IPNDV)
  • 3.2.3.
  • Nuclear Threat Initiative's Verification Pilot Project (NTI Project)
  • 3.2.4.
  • United Kingdom-United States Technical Cooperation Programme
  • 3.2.5.
  • Trilateral Initiative
  • 3.2.6.
  • multilateral context: 'Taking forward nuclear disarmament'
  • Fissile Material Prohibition Treaty (FMT)/(FM(C)T)--
  • 3.3.
  • Legally binding treaties and other relevant arrangements and initiatives
  • 3.3.1.
  • Summary
  • 3.3.2.
  • Bacteriological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC)
  • 3.3.3.
  • Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)
  • 3.3.4.
  • 1.1.
  • Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT)
  • 3.3.5.
  • Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)
  • 3.3.6.
  • IAEA safeguards
  • 3.3.7.
  • Nuclear-weapon-free zones (NWFZs)
  • 3.3.8.
  • United-States-Russian Federation bilateral collaboration
  • 3.3.9.
  • Summary
  • Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC)
  • 3.3.10.
  • European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM)
  • 3.3.11.
  • Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty
  • 3.3.12.
  • Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty
  • 3.3.13.
  • Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA): Islamic Republic of Iran
  • 3.4.
  • 1.2.
  • The
  • United Nations and verification Issues
  • 3.4.1.
  • Security Council
  • 3.4.2.
  • General Assembly
  • 3.4.3.
  • Secretary-General
  • 3.4.4.
  • Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG) 2016
  • Introduction
  • 3.4.5.
  • Draft Model Convention on Nuclear Weapons
  • 3.4.6.
  • Fissile Material Group of Government Experts
  • 4.
  • Key verification challenges and analogies
  • 4.1.
  • Summary
  • 4.2.
  • General
Control code
965549323
Extent
1 online resource (45 pages)
Form of item
online
Media category
computer
Media MARC source
rdamedia
Media type code
  • c
Specific material designation
remote
System control number
(OCoLC)965549323

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