Coverart for item
The Resource Political Economy for Public Policy

Political Economy for Public Policy

Label
Political Economy for Public Policy
Title
Political Economy for Public Policy
Creator
Subject
Genre
Language
eng
Summary
This textbook uses modern political economy to introduce students of political science, government, economics, and public policy to the politics of the policymaking process. The book's distinct political economy approach has two virtues. By developing general principles for thinking about policymaking, it can be applied across a range of issue areas. It also unifies the policy curriculum, offering coherence to standard methods for teaching economics and statistics, and drawing connections between fields. The book begins by exploring the normative foundations of policymaking--political theory, social choice theory, and the Paretian and utilitarian underpinnings of policy analysis. It then introduces game theoretic models of social dilemmas--externalities, coordination problems, and commitment problems--that create opportunities for policy to improve social welfare. Finally, it shows how the political process creates technological and incentive constraints on government that shape policy outcomes. Throughout, concepts and models are illustrated and reinforced with discussions of empirical evidence and case studies.This textbook is essential for all students of public policy and for anyone interested in the most current methods influencing policymaking today. Comprehensive approach to politics and policy suitable for advanced undergraduates and graduate studentsModels unify policy curriculum through methodological coherence Exercises at the end of every chapterSelf-contained appendices cover necessary game theoryExtensive discussion of cases and applications
Cataloging source
IDEBK
http://library.link/vocab/creatorName
Bueno de Mesquita, Ethan
Index
index present
Language note
In English
Literary form
non fiction
Nature of contents
  • dictionaries
  • bibliography
http://library.link/vocab/subjectName
  • Economics
  • Political planning
  • Policy sciences
  • BUSINESS & ECONOMICS
  • BUSINESS & ECONOMICS
  • Economics
  • Policy sciences
  • Political planning
  • POLITICAL SCIENCE / Public Policy / General
Label
Political Economy for Public Policy
Instantiates
Publication
Bibliography note
Includes bibliographical references and index
Carrier category
online resource
Carrier category code
  • cr
Carrier MARC source
rdacarrier
Content category
text
Content type code
  • txt
Content type MARC source
rdacontent
Contents
  • Cover; Title; Copyright; Dedication; Summary of Contents; Contents; Policy Applications; Preface; For Whom Is This Book Written?; A Word on Tone and Technicality; Acknowledgments; Introduction; Three Goals; The Role of Models; Why Rationality?; I NORMATIVE FOUNDATIONS; 1 Normative Frameworks; 1.1 What Is a Normative Framework?; 1.1.1 Private vs. Public Morality; 1.2 Utilitarianism; 1.2.1 Why Be a Utilitarian?; 1.2.2 Some Problems for Utilitarianism; 1.3 Egalitarianism; 1.3.1 Equality of Outcomes; 1.3.2 Equality of Opportunity; 1.4 Kantian Deontology
  • 1.4.1 Deontology and the Challenges to Utilitarianism1.4.2 Challenges for Deontological Thinking; 1.5 Libertarianism; 1.5.1 Why Be a Libertarian?; 1.5.2 Some Problems for Libertarianism; 1.6 Takeaways; 1.7 Further Reading; 1.8 Exercises; 2 Collective Goals; 2.1 Rational Individuals; 2.2 Aggregation Procedures; 2.3 Evaluative Criteria for Aggregation Procedures; 2.3.1 Transitivity of Social Preferences; 2.3.2 Unanimity; 2.3.3 Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives; 2.4 Arrow's Theorem; 2.5 Social Decisions Instead of Social Preferences; 2.6 The Public Interest?
  • 2.6.1 Only Two Alternatives: May's Theorem2.6.2 Ruling Out Some Collections of Preferences: The Median Voter Theorem; 2.6.3 Intensity of Preferences; 2.6.4 Agreement; 2.7 Takeaways; 2.8 Further Reading; 2.9 Exercises; 3 Pareto Concepts; 3.1 Pareto Concepts; 3.2 From Pareto Efficiency to Pareto Improvements; 3.3 A Model of Policies and Preferences; 3.3.1 Actions and Transfers; 3.3.2 Quasi Linearity: A Bridge from Pareto Efficiency to Pareto Improvement; 3.4 A Bridge Too Far?; 3.4.1 Limited Transfers and Distributional Concerns; 3.4.2 Non Quasi Linear Preferences
  • 3.5 Relationship to Cost-Benefit Analysis3.6 Are Pareto Improvements Unambiguously in the Public Interest?; 3.7 Takeaways; 3.8 Further Reading; 3.9 Exercises; 3.10 Appendix: Proof of Theorem 3.3.1; Summing Up Normative Foundations; II SOCIAL DILEMMAS; 4 Externalities; 4.1 Collective Action; 4.1.1 The Social Dilemma; 4.1.2 Interpretations; 4.2 Public Goods; 4.2.1 Comparison to the First Best or Utilitarian Optimum; 4.2.2 Interpretation; 4.2.3 Concentrated vs. Diffuse Interests; 4.3 The Tragedy of the Commons; 4.3.1 A Pareto Improvement; 4.3.2 The First Best; 4.3.3 Interpretation
  • 4.4 Policy Interventions4.4.1 The Failure of Persuasion; 4.4.2 Pigovian Subsidies and Taxes; 4.4.3 Regulation; 4.5 The Theory of the Second Best; 4.5.1 The Second Best Pigovian Subsidy; 4.6 Alternative Responses; 4.6.1 Altruism; 4.6.2 A Market in Externalities; 4.6.3 Ongoing Relationships and Self Organization; 4.7 Takeaways; 4.8 Further Reading; 4.9 Exercises; 5 Coordination Problems; 5.1 Coordination Failure; 5.1.1 Interpretation; 5.2 Coordination Traps; 5.2.1 A Basic Model of Coordination Traps: Investment in Developing Countries; 5.2.2 A Model of Bank Runs; 5.2.3 A Model of Revolutions
Control code
ocn953847935
Dimensions
unknown
Extent
1 online resource
Form of item
online
Isbn
9781400883189
Media category
computer
Media MARC source
rdamedia
Media type code
  • c
Note
JSTOR
Other control number
10.1515/9781400883189
http://library.link/vocab/ext/overdrive/overdriveId
  • 941288
  • 22573/ctvc656gt
Specific material designation
remote
System control number
(OCoLC)953847935
Label
Political Economy for Public Policy
Publication
Bibliography note
Includes bibliographical references and index
Carrier category
online resource
Carrier category code
  • cr
Carrier MARC source
rdacarrier
Content category
text
Content type code
  • txt
Content type MARC source
rdacontent
Contents
  • Cover; Title; Copyright; Dedication; Summary of Contents; Contents; Policy Applications; Preface; For Whom Is This Book Written?; A Word on Tone and Technicality; Acknowledgments; Introduction; Three Goals; The Role of Models; Why Rationality?; I NORMATIVE FOUNDATIONS; 1 Normative Frameworks; 1.1 What Is a Normative Framework?; 1.1.1 Private vs. Public Morality; 1.2 Utilitarianism; 1.2.1 Why Be a Utilitarian?; 1.2.2 Some Problems for Utilitarianism; 1.3 Egalitarianism; 1.3.1 Equality of Outcomes; 1.3.2 Equality of Opportunity; 1.4 Kantian Deontology
  • 1.4.1 Deontology and the Challenges to Utilitarianism1.4.2 Challenges for Deontological Thinking; 1.5 Libertarianism; 1.5.1 Why Be a Libertarian?; 1.5.2 Some Problems for Libertarianism; 1.6 Takeaways; 1.7 Further Reading; 1.8 Exercises; 2 Collective Goals; 2.1 Rational Individuals; 2.2 Aggregation Procedures; 2.3 Evaluative Criteria for Aggregation Procedures; 2.3.1 Transitivity of Social Preferences; 2.3.2 Unanimity; 2.3.3 Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives; 2.4 Arrow's Theorem; 2.5 Social Decisions Instead of Social Preferences; 2.6 The Public Interest?
  • 2.6.1 Only Two Alternatives: May's Theorem2.6.2 Ruling Out Some Collections of Preferences: The Median Voter Theorem; 2.6.3 Intensity of Preferences; 2.6.4 Agreement; 2.7 Takeaways; 2.8 Further Reading; 2.9 Exercises; 3 Pareto Concepts; 3.1 Pareto Concepts; 3.2 From Pareto Efficiency to Pareto Improvements; 3.3 A Model of Policies and Preferences; 3.3.1 Actions and Transfers; 3.3.2 Quasi Linearity: A Bridge from Pareto Efficiency to Pareto Improvement; 3.4 A Bridge Too Far?; 3.4.1 Limited Transfers and Distributional Concerns; 3.4.2 Non Quasi Linear Preferences
  • 3.5 Relationship to Cost-Benefit Analysis3.6 Are Pareto Improvements Unambiguously in the Public Interest?; 3.7 Takeaways; 3.8 Further Reading; 3.9 Exercises; 3.10 Appendix: Proof of Theorem 3.3.1; Summing Up Normative Foundations; II SOCIAL DILEMMAS; 4 Externalities; 4.1 Collective Action; 4.1.1 The Social Dilemma; 4.1.2 Interpretations; 4.2 Public Goods; 4.2.1 Comparison to the First Best or Utilitarian Optimum; 4.2.2 Interpretation; 4.2.3 Concentrated vs. Diffuse Interests; 4.3 The Tragedy of the Commons; 4.3.1 A Pareto Improvement; 4.3.2 The First Best; 4.3.3 Interpretation
  • 4.4 Policy Interventions4.4.1 The Failure of Persuasion; 4.4.2 Pigovian Subsidies and Taxes; 4.4.3 Regulation; 4.5 The Theory of the Second Best; 4.5.1 The Second Best Pigovian Subsidy; 4.6 Alternative Responses; 4.6.1 Altruism; 4.6.2 A Market in Externalities; 4.6.3 Ongoing Relationships and Self Organization; 4.7 Takeaways; 4.8 Further Reading; 4.9 Exercises; 5 Coordination Problems; 5.1 Coordination Failure; 5.1.1 Interpretation; 5.2 Coordination Traps; 5.2.1 A Basic Model of Coordination Traps: Investment in Developing Countries; 5.2.2 A Model of Bank Runs; 5.2.3 A Model of Revolutions
Control code
ocn953847935
Dimensions
unknown
Extent
1 online resource
Form of item
online
Isbn
9781400883189
Media category
computer
Media MARC source
rdamedia
Media type code
  • c
Note
JSTOR
Other control number
10.1515/9781400883189
http://library.link/vocab/ext/overdrive/overdriveId
  • 941288
  • 22573/ctvc656gt
Specific material designation
remote
System control number
(OCoLC)953847935

Library Locations

    • Copley LibraryBorrow it
      5998 Alcalá Park, San Diego, CA, 92110-2492, US
      32.771354 -117.193327
Processing Feedback ...