The Resource The Mussa Theorem (and other results on IMF-induced moral hazard), prepared by Olivier Jeanne and Jeromin Zettelmeyer
The Mussa Theorem (and other results on IMF-induced moral hazard), prepared by Olivier Jeanne and Jeromin Zettelmeyer
Resource Information
The item The Mussa Theorem (and other results on IMF-induced moral hazard), prepared by Olivier Jeanne and Jeromin Zettelmeyer represents a specific, individual, material embodiment of a distinct intellectual or artistic creation found in University of San Diego Libraries.This item is available to borrow from 1 library branch.
Resource Information
The item The Mussa Theorem (and other results on IMF-induced moral hazard), prepared by Olivier Jeanne and Jeromin Zettelmeyer represents a specific, individual, material embodiment of a distinct intellectual or artistic creation found in University of San Diego Libraries.
This item is available to borrow from 1 library branch.
- Summary
- Using a simple model of international lending, we show that as long as the IMF lends at an actuarially fair interest rate and debtor governments maximize the welfare of their taxpayers, any changes in policy effort, capital flows, or borrowing costs in response to IMF crisis lending are efficient. Thus, under these assumptions, the IMF cannot cause moral hazard, as argued by Michael Mussa (1999, 2004). It follows that examining the effects of IMF lending on capital flows or borrowing costs is not a useful strategy to test for IMF-induced moral hazard. Instead, empirical research on moral hazard should focus on the assumptions of the Mussa theorem
- Language
- eng
- Extent
- 1 online resource (25 pages)
- Contents
-
- ""Contents""; ""I. INTRODUCTION""; ""II. A SIMPLE MODEL OF THE IMF""; ""A. Assumptions""; ""B. Laissez-Faire""; ""C. Effects of IMF Lending""; ""D. The Mussa Theorem""; ""E. Two Doors for Moral Hazard to Come Back""; ""III. IMPLICATIONS OF THE MUSSA THEOREM""; ""A. Implications for the Empirical Literature on IMF-Induced Moral Hazard""; ""B. Implications for IMF Lending Policies""; ""IV. CONCLUSIONS""; ""References""
- Isbn
- 9781282020047
- Label
- The Mussa Theorem (and other results on IMF-induced moral hazard)
- Title
- The Mussa Theorem (and other results on IMF-induced moral hazard)
- Statement of responsibility
- prepared by Olivier Jeanne and Jeromin Zettelmeyer
- Language
- eng
- Summary
- Using a simple model of international lending, we show that as long as the IMF lends at an actuarially fair interest rate and debtor governments maximize the welfare of their taxpayers, any changes in policy effort, capital flows, or borrowing costs in response to IMF crisis lending are efficient. Thus, under these assumptions, the IMF cannot cause moral hazard, as argued by Michael Mussa (1999, 2004). It follows that examining the effects of IMF lending on capital flows or borrowing costs is not a useful strategy to test for IMF-induced moral hazard. Instead, empirical research on moral hazard should focus on the assumptions of the Mussa theorem
- Action
- digitized
- Cataloging source
- OCLCE
- http://bibfra.me/vocab/lite/collectionName
- IMF eLibrary
- http://library.link/vocab/creatorName
- Jeanne, Olivier
- Index
- no index present
- LC call number
- HG3881.5.I58
- LC item number
- W67 no.04/192 ONLINE
- Literary form
- non fiction
- Nature of contents
- dictionaries
- http://library.link/vocab/relatedWorkOrContributorName
-
- Zettelmeyer, Jeromin
- International Monetary Fund
- Series statement
- IMF Working Paper
- Series volume
- WP/04/192
- http://library.link/vocab/subjectName
-
- International Monetary Fund
- International Monetary Fund
- Financial crises
- Moral hazard
- Capital Flows
- Capital Inflows
- Capital Markets
- Financial crises
- International Capital Markets
- International Monetary Arrangements and Institutions
- Moral hazard
- Argentina
- Label
- The Mussa Theorem (and other results on IMF-induced moral hazard), prepared by Olivier Jeanne and Jeromin Zettelmeyer
- Antecedent source
- file reproduced from original
- Bibliography note
- Includes bibliographical references
- Carrier category
- online resource
- Carrier category code
-
- cr
- Carrier MARC source
- rdacarrier
- Color
- black and white
- Content category
- text
- Content type code
-
- txt
- Content type MARC source
- rdacontent
- Contents
- ""Contents""; ""I. INTRODUCTION""; ""II. A SIMPLE MODEL OF THE IMF""; ""A. Assumptions""; ""B. Laissez-Faire""; ""C. Effects of IMF Lending""; ""D. The Mussa Theorem""; ""E. Two Doors for Moral Hazard to Come Back""; ""III. IMPLICATIONS OF THE MUSSA THEOREM""; ""A. Implications for the Empirical Literature on IMF-Induced Moral Hazard""; ""B. Implications for IMF Lending Policies""; ""IV. CONCLUSIONS""; ""References""
- Control code
- 647081482
- Dimensions
- unknown
- Extent
- 1 online resource (25 pages)
- Form of item
- online
- Isbn
- 9781282020047
- Issn
- 2227-8885
- Level of compression
-
- lossless
- lossy
- Media category
- computer
- Media MARC source
- rdamedia
- Media type code
-
- c
- Other control number
- 10.5089/9781451905151.001
- Reformatting quality
-
- preservation
- access
- Reproduction note
- Electronic reproduction.
- Specific material designation
- remote
- System control number
-
- imfWPIEA1922004
- (IMF)WPIEA1922004
- (OCoLC)647081482
- System details
- Master and use copy. Digital master created according to Benchmark for Faithful Digital Reproductions of Monographs and Serials, Version 1. Digital Library Federation, December 2002.
- Label
- The Mussa Theorem (and other results on IMF-induced moral hazard), prepared by Olivier Jeanne and Jeromin Zettelmeyer
- Antecedent source
- file reproduced from original
- Bibliography note
- Includes bibliographical references
- Carrier category
- online resource
- Carrier category code
-
- cr
- Carrier MARC source
- rdacarrier
- Color
- black and white
- Content category
- text
- Content type code
-
- txt
- Content type MARC source
- rdacontent
- Contents
- ""Contents""; ""I. INTRODUCTION""; ""II. A SIMPLE MODEL OF THE IMF""; ""A. Assumptions""; ""B. Laissez-Faire""; ""C. Effects of IMF Lending""; ""D. The Mussa Theorem""; ""E. Two Doors for Moral Hazard to Come Back""; ""III. IMPLICATIONS OF THE MUSSA THEOREM""; ""A. Implications for the Empirical Literature on IMF-Induced Moral Hazard""; ""B. Implications for IMF Lending Policies""; ""IV. CONCLUSIONS""; ""References""
- Control code
- 647081482
- Dimensions
- unknown
- Extent
- 1 online resource (25 pages)
- Form of item
- online
- Isbn
- 9781282020047
- Issn
- 2227-8885
- Level of compression
-
- lossless
- lossy
- Media category
- computer
- Media MARC source
- rdamedia
- Media type code
-
- c
- Other control number
- 10.5089/9781451905151.001
- Reformatting quality
-
- preservation
- access
- Reproduction note
- Electronic reproduction.
- Specific material designation
- remote
- System control number
-
- imfWPIEA1922004
- (IMF)WPIEA1922004
- (OCoLC)647081482
- System details
- Master and use copy. Digital master created according to Benchmark for Faithful Digital Reproductions of Monographs and Serials, Version 1. Digital Library Federation, December 2002.
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<div class="citation" vocab="http://schema.org/"><i class="fa fa-external-link-square fa-fw"></i> Data from <span resource="http://link.sandiego.edu/portal/The-Mussa-Theorem-and-other-results-on/997qEJS_Ln4/" typeof="Book http://bibfra.me/vocab/lite/Item"><span property="name http://bibfra.me/vocab/lite/label"><a href="http://link.sandiego.edu/portal/The-Mussa-Theorem-and-other-results-on/997qEJS_Ln4/">The Mussa Theorem (and other results on IMF-induced moral hazard), prepared by Olivier Jeanne and Jeromin Zettelmeyer</a></span> - <span property="potentialAction" typeOf="OrganizeAction"><span property="agent" typeof="LibrarySystem http://library.link/vocab/LibrarySystem" resource="http://link.sandiego.edu/"><span property="name http://bibfra.me/vocab/lite/label"><a property="url" href="http://link.sandiego.edu/">University of San Diego Libraries</a></span></span></span></span></div>
