Coverart for item
The Resource The Mussa Theorem (and other results on IMF-induced moral hazard), prepared by Olivier Jeanne and Jeromin Zettelmeyer

The Mussa Theorem (and other results on IMF-induced moral hazard), prepared by Olivier Jeanne and Jeromin Zettelmeyer

Label
The Mussa Theorem (and other results on IMF-induced moral hazard)
Title
The Mussa Theorem (and other results on IMF-induced moral hazard)
Statement of responsibility
prepared by Olivier Jeanne and Jeromin Zettelmeyer
Creator
Contributor
Author
Issuing body
Subject
Genre
Language
eng
Summary
Using a simple model of international lending, we show that as long as the IMF lends at an actuarially fair interest rate and debtor governments maximize the welfare of their taxpayers, any changes in policy effort, capital flows, or borrowing costs in response to IMF crisis lending are efficient. Thus, under these assumptions, the IMF cannot cause moral hazard, as argued by Michael Mussa (1999, 2004). It follows that examining the effects of IMF lending on capital flows or borrowing costs is not a useful strategy to test for IMF-induced moral hazard. Instead, empirical research on moral hazard should focus on the assumptions of the Mussa theorem
Member of
Action
digitized
Cataloging source
OCLCE
http://bibfra.me/vocab/lite/collectionName
IMF eLibrary
http://library.link/vocab/creatorName
Jeanne, Olivier
Index
no index present
LC call number
HG3881.5.I58
LC item number
W67 no.04/192 ONLINE
Literary form
non fiction
Nature of contents
dictionaries
http://library.link/vocab/relatedWorkOrContributorName
  • Zettelmeyer, Jeromin
  • International Monetary Fund
Series statement
IMF Working Paper
Series volume
WP/04/192
http://library.link/vocab/subjectName
  • International Monetary Fund
  • International Monetary Fund
  • Financial crises
  • Moral hazard
  • Capital Flows
  • Capital Inflows
  • Capital Markets
  • Financial crises
  • International Capital Markets
  • International Monetary Arrangements and Institutions
  • Moral hazard
  • Argentina
Label
The Mussa Theorem (and other results on IMF-induced moral hazard), prepared by Olivier Jeanne and Jeromin Zettelmeyer
Instantiates
Publication
Copyright
Antecedent source
file reproduced from original
Bibliography note
Includes bibliographical references
Carrier category
online resource
Carrier category code
  • cr
Carrier MARC source
rdacarrier
Color
black and white
Content category
text
Content type code
  • txt
Content type MARC source
rdacontent
Contents
""Contents""; ""I. INTRODUCTION""; ""II. A SIMPLE MODEL OF THE IMF""; ""A. Assumptions""; ""B. Laissez-Faire""; ""C. Effects of IMF Lending""; ""D. The Mussa Theorem""; ""E. Two Doors for Moral Hazard to Come Back""; ""III. IMPLICATIONS OF THE MUSSA THEOREM""; ""A. Implications for the Empirical Literature on IMF-Induced Moral Hazard""; ""B. Implications for IMF Lending Policies""; ""IV. CONCLUSIONS""; ""References""
Control code
647081482
Dimensions
unknown
Extent
1 online resource (25 pages)
Form of item
online
Isbn
9781282020047
Issn
2227-8885
Level of compression
  • lossless
  • lossy
Media category
computer
Media MARC source
rdamedia
Media type code
  • c
Other control number
10.5089/9781451905151.001
Reformatting quality
  • preservation
  • access
Reproduction note
Electronic reproduction.
Specific material designation
remote
System control number
  • imfWPIEA1922004
  • (IMF)WPIEA1922004
  • (OCoLC)647081482
System details
Master and use copy. Digital master created according to Benchmark for Faithful Digital Reproductions of Monographs and Serials, Version 1. Digital Library Federation, December 2002.
Label
The Mussa Theorem (and other results on IMF-induced moral hazard), prepared by Olivier Jeanne and Jeromin Zettelmeyer
Publication
Copyright
Antecedent source
file reproduced from original
Bibliography note
Includes bibliographical references
Carrier category
online resource
Carrier category code
  • cr
Carrier MARC source
rdacarrier
Color
black and white
Content category
text
Content type code
  • txt
Content type MARC source
rdacontent
Contents
""Contents""; ""I. INTRODUCTION""; ""II. A SIMPLE MODEL OF THE IMF""; ""A. Assumptions""; ""B. Laissez-Faire""; ""C. Effects of IMF Lending""; ""D. The Mussa Theorem""; ""E. Two Doors for Moral Hazard to Come Back""; ""III. IMPLICATIONS OF THE MUSSA THEOREM""; ""A. Implications for the Empirical Literature on IMF-Induced Moral Hazard""; ""B. Implications for IMF Lending Policies""; ""IV. CONCLUSIONS""; ""References""
Control code
647081482
Dimensions
unknown
Extent
1 online resource (25 pages)
Form of item
online
Isbn
9781282020047
Issn
2227-8885
Level of compression
  • lossless
  • lossy
Media category
computer
Media MARC source
rdamedia
Media type code
  • c
Other control number
10.5089/9781451905151.001
Reformatting quality
  • preservation
  • access
Reproduction note
Electronic reproduction.
Specific material designation
remote
System control number
  • imfWPIEA1922004
  • (IMF)WPIEA1922004
  • (OCoLC)647081482
System details
Master and use copy. Digital master created according to Benchmark for Faithful Digital Reproductions of Monographs and Serials, Version 1. Digital Library Federation, December 2002.

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