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The Resource The impact of incomplete contracts on economics, edited by Philippe Aghion, Mathias Dewatripont, Patrick Legros and Luigi Zingales

The impact of incomplete contracts on economics, edited by Philippe Aghion, Mathias Dewatripont, Patrick Legros and Luigi Zingales

Label
The impact of incomplete contracts on economics
Title
The impact of incomplete contracts on economics
Statement of responsibility
edited by Philippe Aghion, Mathias Dewatripont, Patrick Legros and Luigi Zingales
Contributor
Editor
Subject
Language
eng
Summary
"The 1986 article by Grossman and Hart "A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration" has provided a framework for understanding how firm boundaries are defined and how they affect economic performance. The property rights approach has provided a formal way to introduce incomplete contracting ideas into economic modeling. The Impact of Incomplete Contracts on Economics collects papers and opinion pieces on the impact that this property right approach to the firm has had on the economics profession. It shows that the impact has been felt sometimes in significant ways in a variety of fields, ranging from the theory of the firm and their internal organization to industrial organization, international trade, finance, management, public economy, and political economy and political science. Beyond acknowledging how the property rights approach has permeated economics as a whole, the contributions in the book also highlight the road ahead--how the paradigm may change the way research is performed in some of the fields, and what type of research is still missing. The book concludes with a discussion of the foundations of the property rights, and more generally the incomplete contracting, approaches and with a series of contributions showing how behavioral considerations may provide a new way forward"--
Assigning source
Provided by publisher
Cataloging source
DLC
Illustrations
illustrations
Index
index present
LC call number
KF817
LC item number
.I47 2016
Literary form
non fiction
Nature of contents
bibliography
http://library.link/vocab/relatedWorkOrContributorDate
1958-
http://library.link/vocab/relatedWorkOrContributorName
  • Aghion, Philippe
  • Dewatripont, M.
  • Legros, Patrick
  • Zingales, Luigi
http://library.link/vocab/subjectName
  • Incomplete contracts
  • Incomplete contracts
  • United States
Label
The impact of incomplete contracts on economics, edited by Philippe Aghion, Mathias Dewatripont, Patrick Legros and Luigi Zingales
Instantiates
Publication
Copyright
Bibliography note
Includes bibliographical references and index
Carrier category
volume
Carrier category code
  • nc
Carrier MARC source
rdacarrier
Content category
text
Content type code
  • txt
Content type MARC source
rdacontent
Contents
  • Jean Tirole (Toulouse School of Economics)
  • Incomplete contracts and political economy/
  • Gerard Roland (University of Berkeley)
  • 29.
  • Incomplete contracts and the design of
  • Guido Tabellini (Department of Economics and IGIER, Universita Bocconi)
  • Part 10.
  • Incomplete contracts, mechanism design and complexity
  • 30.
  • Comments on the foundations of incomplete contracts
  • Eric Maskin
  • 4.
  • 31.
  • Comments on the foundations of incomplete contracts
  • John Moore (University of Edinburgh and London School of Economics)
  • 32.
  • Incomplete contracts and mechanism design
  • Richard Holden (University of New South Wales)
  • 33.
  • Complexity and undescribability
  • Nabil I. Al-Najjar (Northwestern University), Luca Anderlini (Georgetown University), and Leonardo Felli (London School of Economics)
  • Part 11.
  • Property rights and transaction cost theories
  • Incomplete contracts, reference points and communication
  • 34.
  • New directions of incomplete contracts: reference points, communication, and renegotiation
  • Christian Zehnder (University of Lausanne)
  • 35.\tSome recent experimental evidence on contracts as reference points
  • Klaus Schmidt (University of Munich)
  • 36.
  • Incomplete contracting in the field
  • Antoinette Schoar (Harvard University)
  • Steven Tadelis (University of California-Berkeley and eBay Research Labs)
  • 5.
  • GH and applied theory
  • Thomas Hubbard (Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University)
  • Part 2.
  • Incomplete contracts and firm boundaries
  • 6.
  • Part 1.
  • Incomplete contracts and firm boundaries : new directions
  • Wouter Dessein (Columbia University)
  • 7.
  • Discussion of Wouter Dessein's "Incomplete Contracts and Firm Boundaries : New Directions"
  • Francine Lafontaine (University of Michigan)
  • 8.
  • Comment on "Incomplete contracts and firm goundaries: new directions" by Wouter Dessein
  • Michael D. Whinston (MIT)
  • Part 3.
  • Incomplete contracts and internal organization
  • Perspectives on Grossman and Hart (1986)
  • 9.
  • Incomplete contracts and the internal organization of firms
  • Phillipe Aghion (Harvard University), Nicholas Bloom (Stanford University), John Van Reenen (London School of Economics)
  • 10.
  • Comments on Aghion, Bloom and Van Reenen "Incomplete contracts and the internal organization of firms"
  • John Roberts (Stanford University)
  • 11. The
  • empirical implications of the Grossman-Hart model : comments on "Incomplete contracts an the internal organization of firms" by P. Aghion, N. Bloom and J. Van Reenen
  • W. Bentley McLeod (Columbia University)
  • Part 4.
  • 1. Introductory remarks on Grossman and Hart (1986)
  • Incomplete contracts and corporate finance
  • 12.
  • Corporate finance, incomplete contracts, and corporate control
  • Patrick Bolton (Columbia University)
  • 13.
  • Discussion of Patrick Bolton's "Corporate finance, incomplete contracts, and corporate control"
  • Efraim Benmelech (Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University)
  • 14.
  • Why incomplete contract is important for finance
  • Luigi Zingales (The University of Chicago Booth School of Business)
  • John Moore (University of Edinburgh and London School of Economics)
  • Part 5.
  • Incomplete contracts and business firms
  • 15.
  • Oliver Hart's contributions to the understanding of strategic alliances and technology licensing
  • Josh Lerner (Harvard University)
  • 16.
  • Incomplete contracts and venture
  • Steve Kaplan (The University of Chicago Booth School of Business)
  • 17.
  • Incomplete contracts and the role of small firms
  • 2.
  • Jeremy C. Stein (Harvard University)
  • Part 6.
  • Incomplete contracts and industrial organization
  • 18.
  • Contracts, ownership and industrial organization: past and future
  • Patrick Legros (Université libre de Bruxelles) and Andrew F. Newman (Boston University)
  • 19.
  • Discussion of "Contracts, ownership and industrial organization: past and future," by Patrick Legros and Andrew Newman
  • Mathias Dewatripont (Université libre de Bruxelles and National Bank of Belgium)
  • 20.
  • Grossman-Hart (1986) as a theory of markets
  • Discussion of "Contracts, ownership and industrial organization: past and future," by Patrick Legros and Andrew Newman
  • Kai-Uwe Kühn (University of Michigan)
  • Part 7.
  • Incomplete contracts and international trade
  • 21.
  • Grossman-Hart (1986) goes global : incomplete contracts, property rights, and the international organization of production
  • Pol Antràs (Harvard University)
  • 22.
  • Comment on Pol Antràs : "Grossman-Hart (1986) goes global: incomplete contracts, property rights, and the international organization of production"
  • Elhanan Helpman (Harvard University)
  • Bengt Holmström (MIT)
  • 23. The
  • Theory of the firm goes global
  • Dalia Marin (University of Munich)
  • Part 8.
  • Incomplete contracts and public ownership
  • 24.
  • Incomplete contracts and not for profit
  • Paul Grout (University of Bristol)
  • 25.
  • Firm Ownership: the legacy of Grossman and Hart
  • 3. Remarks on incomplete
  • Henry Hansmann (Yale Law School)
  • 26.
  • Ex-Ante anonymity and government allocation of property rights
  • Rohan Pitchford (Australian National University)
  • Part 9.
  • Incomplete contracts and political economy
  • 27.
  • Political treaties as incomplete contracts
  • Bård Harstad (University of Oslo)
  • 28.
Control code
914326195
Dimensions
24 cm
Extent
xiv, 419 pages
Isbn
9780199826216
Lccn
2015034912
Media category
unmediated
Media MARC source
rdamedia
Media type code
  • n
Other physical details
illustrations
System control number
(OCoLC)914326195
Label
The impact of incomplete contracts on economics, edited by Philippe Aghion, Mathias Dewatripont, Patrick Legros and Luigi Zingales
Publication
Copyright
Bibliography note
Includes bibliographical references and index
Carrier category
volume
Carrier category code
  • nc
Carrier MARC source
rdacarrier
Content category
text
Content type code
  • txt
Content type MARC source
rdacontent
Contents
  • Jean Tirole (Toulouse School of Economics)
  • Incomplete contracts and political economy/
  • Gerard Roland (University of Berkeley)
  • 29.
  • Incomplete contracts and the design of
  • Guido Tabellini (Department of Economics and IGIER, Universita Bocconi)
  • Part 10.
  • Incomplete contracts, mechanism design and complexity
  • 30.
  • Comments on the foundations of incomplete contracts
  • Eric Maskin
  • 4.
  • 31.
  • Comments on the foundations of incomplete contracts
  • John Moore (University of Edinburgh and London School of Economics)
  • 32.
  • Incomplete contracts and mechanism design
  • Richard Holden (University of New South Wales)
  • 33.
  • Complexity and undescribability
  • Nabil I. Al-Najjar (Northwestern University), Luca Anderlini (Georgetown University), and Leonardo Felli (London School of Economics)
  • Part 11.
  • Property rights and transaction cost theories
  • Incomplete contracts, reference points and communication
  • 34.
  • New directions of incomplete contracts: reference points, communication, and renegotiation
  • Christian Zehnder (University of Lausanne)
  • 35.\tSome recent experimental evidence on contracts as reference points
  • Klaus Schmidt (University of Munich)
  • 36.
  • Incomplete contracting in the field
  • Antoinette Schoar (Harvard University)
  • Steven Tadelis (University of California-Berkeley and eBay Research Labs)
  • 5.
  • GH and applied theory
  • Thomas Hubbard (Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University)
  • Part 2.
  • Incomplete contracts and firm boundaries
  • 6.
  • Part 1.
  • Incomplete contracts and firm boundaries : new directions
  • Wouter Dessein (Columbia University)
  • 7.
  • Discussion of Wouter Dessein's "Incomplete Contracts and Firm Boundaries : New Directions"
  • Francine Lafontaine (University of Michigan)
  • 8.
  • Comment on "Incomplete contracts and firm goundaries: new directions" by Wouter Dessein
  • Michael D. Whinston (MIT)
  • Part 3.
  • Incomplete contracts and internal organization
  • Perspectives on Grossman and Hart (1986)
  • 9.
  • Incomplete contracts and the internal organization of firms
  • Phillipe Aghion (Harvard University), Nicholas Bloom (Stanford University), John Van Reenen (London School of Economics)
  • 10.
  • Comments on Aghion, Bloom and Van Reenen "Incomplete contracts and the internal organization of firms"
  • John Roberts (Stanford University)
  • 11. The
  • empirical implications of the Grossman-Hart model : comments on "Incomplete contracts an the internal organization of firms" by P. Aghion, N. Bloom and J. Van Reenen
  • W. Bentley McLeod (Columbia University)
  • Part 4.
  • 1. Introductory remarks on Grossman and Hart (1986)
  • Incomplete contracts and corporate finance
  • 12.
  • Corporate finance, incomplete contracts, and corporate control
  • Patrick Bolton (Columbia University)
  • 13.
  • Discussion of Patrick Bolton's "Corporate finance, incomplete contracts, and corporate control"
  • Efraim Benmelech (Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University)
  • 14.
  • Why incomplete contract is important for finance
  • Luigi Zingales (The University of Chicago Booth School of Business)
  • John Moore (University of Edinburgh and London School of Economics)
  • Part 5.
  • Incomplete contracts and business firms
  • 15.
  • Oliver Hart's contributions to the understanding of strategic alliances and technology licensing
  • Josh Lerner (Harvard University)
  • 16.
  • Incomplete contracts and venture
  • Steve Kaplan (The University of Chicago Booth School of Business)
  • 17.
  • Incomplete contracts and the role of small firms
  • 2.
  • Jeremy C. Stein (Harvard University)
  • Part 6.
  • Incomplete contracts and industrial organization
  • 18.
  • Contracts, ownership and industrial organization: past and future
  • Patrick Legros (Université libre de Bruxelles) and Andrew F. Newman (Boston University)
  • 19.
  • Discussion of "Contracts, ownership and industrial organization: past and future," by Patrick Legros and Andrew Newman
  • Mathias Dewatripont (Université libre de Bruxelles and National Bank of Belgium)
  • 20.
  • Grossman-Hart (1986) as a theory of markets
  • Discussion of "Contracts, ownership and industrial organization: past and future," by Patrick Legros and Andrew Newman
  • Kai-Uwe Kühn (University of Michigan)
  • Part 7.
  • Incomplete contracts and international trade
  • 21.
  • Grossman-Hart (1986) goes global : incomplete contracts, property rights, and the international organization of production
  • Pol Antràs (Harvard University)
  • 22.
  • Comment on Pol Antràs : "Grossman-Hart (1986) goes global: incomplete contracts, property rights, and the international organization of production"
  • Elhanan Helpman (Harvard University)
  • Bengt Holmström (MIT)
  • 23. The
  • Theory of the firm goes global
  • Dalia Marin (University of Munich)
  • Part 8.
  • Incomplete contracts and public ownership
  • 24.
  • Incomplete contracts and not for profit
  • Paul Grout (University of Bristol)
  • 25.
  • Firm Ownership: the legacy of Grossman and Hart
  • 3. Remarks on incomplete
  • Henry Hansmann (Yale Law School)
  • 26.
  • Ex-Ante anonymity and government allocation of property rights
  • Rohan Pitchford (Australian National University)
  • Part 9.
  • Incomplete contracts and political economy
  • 27.
  • Political treaties as incomplete contracts
  • Bård Harstad (University of Oslo)
  • 28.
Control code
914326195
Dimensions
24 cm
Extent
xiv, 419 pages
Isbn
9780199826216
Lccn
2015034912
Media category
unmediated
Media MARC source
rdamedia
Media type code
  • n
Other physical details
illustrations
System control number
(OCoLC)914326195

Library Locations

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      32.771471 -117.187496
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